2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing;
103 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 unsigned long enforcing;
106 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
107 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118 unsigned long enabled;
119 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
120 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125 int selinux_enabled = 1;
128 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
131 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
134 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
135 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
136 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
137 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
138 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
141 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
147 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
150 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
151 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
152 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
153 * is always considered enabled.
156 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
158 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
161 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
163 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
173 * initialise the security for the init task
175 static void cred_init_security(void)
177 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
178 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
180 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
182 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
184 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
185 cred->security = tsec;
189 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
191 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
195 tsec = cred->security;
200 * get the objective security ID of a task
202 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
207 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
213 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
215 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
217 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
222 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
224 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
226 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
227 u32 sid = current_sid();
229 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
233 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
234 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
236 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
237 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
238 isec->task_sid = sid;
239 inode->i_security = isec;
244 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
246 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
248 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
249 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
252 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
254 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
255 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
257 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
258 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
259 list_del_init(&isec->list);
260 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
263 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
264 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
265 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
266 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
267 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
268 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
269 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
271 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
274 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
276 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
277 u32 sid = current_sid();
279 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
284 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
285 file->f_security = fsec;
290 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
292 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
293 file->f_security = NULL;
297 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
299 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
301 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
305 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
306 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
307 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
309 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
310 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
311 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sb->s_security = sbsec;
317 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
319 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
320 sb->s_security = NULL;
324 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
326 static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
328 "uses transition SIDs",
330 "uses genfs_contexts",
331 "not configured for labeling",
332 "uses mountpoint labeling",
333 "uses native labeling",
336 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
338 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
340 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
349 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
353 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
355 static const match_table_t tokens = {
356 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
357 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
358 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
359 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
364 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
366 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
367 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
368 const struct cred *cred)
370 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
373 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
374 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
378 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
379 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
383 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
384 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
385 const struct cred *cred)
387 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
389 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
390 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
394 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
395 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
399 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
401 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
403 return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
404 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
405 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
406 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
407 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
408 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
409 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
410 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
411 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
414 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
416 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
417 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
418 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
421 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
422 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
423 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
424 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
425 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
426 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
427 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
428 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
429 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
433 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
434 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
435 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
436 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
437 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
438 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
440 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
441 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
442 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
447 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
448 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
449 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
451 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
452 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
453 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
455 /* Initialize the root inode. */
456 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
458 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
459 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
460 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
462 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
464 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
465 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
466 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
467 struct inode_security_struct, list);
468 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
469 list_del_init(&isec->list);
470 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
471 inode = igrab(inode);
473 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
477 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
480 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
486 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
487 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
488 * mount options, or whatever.
490 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
491 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
494 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
495 char *context = NULL;
499 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
501 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
507 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
508 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
510 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
511 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
512 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
514 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
517 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
518 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
519 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
521 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
527 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
528 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
534 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
535 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
538 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
539 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
541 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
542 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
545 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
546 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
548 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
549 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
552 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
553 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
555 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
556 struct inode *root = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
557 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
559 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
562 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
563 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
565 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
566 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
567 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
570 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
575 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
579 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
580 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
582 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
584 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
585 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
586 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
587 (old_sid != new_sid))
590 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
591 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
593 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
594 if (mnt_flags & flag)
600 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
601 * labeling information.
603 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
604 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
605 unsigned long kern_flags,
606 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
608 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
610 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
611 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
612 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
613 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
614 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
615 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
616 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
617 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
618 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
620 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
622 if (!ss_initialized) {
624 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
625 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
626 server is ready to handle calls. */
630 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
631 "before the security server is initialized\n");
634 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
635 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
636 * place the results is not allowed */
642 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
643 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
644 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
645 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
647 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
648 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
649 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
650 * will be used for both mounts)
652 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
657 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
658 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
659 * than once with different security options.
661 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
664 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
666 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
667 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
669 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
670 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
671 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
678 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
680 goto out_double_mount;
682 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
687 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
689 goto out_double_mount;
691 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
693 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
694 rootcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
704 defcontext_sid = sid;
706 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
708 goto out_double_mount;
710 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
719 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
720 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
721 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
722 goto out_double_mount;
727 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
728 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
730 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
732 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
735 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
738 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
739 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
743 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
745 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
749 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
753 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
754 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
755 * the superblock context if not already set.
757 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
758 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
759 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
763 if (!fscontext_sid) {
764 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
768 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
770 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
775 if (!rootcontext_sid)
776 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
778 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
779 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
782 if (rootcontext_sid) {
783 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
788 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
789 root_isec->initialized = 1;
792 if (defcontext_sid) {
793 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
794 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
797 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
801 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
802 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
808 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
811 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
813 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
817 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
818 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
822 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
823 const struct super_block *newsb)
825 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
826 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
827 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
828 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
830 if (oldflags != newflags)
832 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
834 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
836 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
838 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
839 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root)->i_security;
840 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root)->i_security;
841 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
846 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
847 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
848 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
852 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
853 struct super_block *newsb)
855 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
856 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
858 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
859 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
860 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
863 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
864 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
869 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
870 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
872 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
873 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
874 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
876 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
878 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
880 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
881 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
882 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
885 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
889 if (!set_rootcontext) {
890 struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
891 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
894 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
896 if (set_rootcontext) {
897 const struct inode *oldinode = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root);
898 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
899 struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
900 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
902 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
905 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
906 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
910 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
911 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
914 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
915 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
916 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
918 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
920 /* Standard string-based options. */
921 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
923 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
928 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
932 if (context || defcontext) {
934 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
937 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
947 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
950 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
957 case Opt_rootcontext:
960 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
963 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
971 if (context || defcontext) {
973 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
976 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
982 case Opt_labelsupport:
986 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
993 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
997 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
998 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
999 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1004 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1005 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1008 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1009 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1012 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1013 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1016 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1017 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1020 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1031 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1033 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1036 char *options = data;
1037 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1039 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1044 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1046 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1051 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1054 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1058 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1059 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1064 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1067 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1068 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1072 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1074 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1077 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1079 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1080 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1082 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1083 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1087 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1093 /* we need a comma before each option */
1095 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1098 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1104 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1106 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1109 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1111 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1117 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1119 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1124 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1126 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1128 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1130 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1132 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1134 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1136 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1138 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1140 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1144 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1147 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1149 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1152 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1154 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1157 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1163 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1164 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1166 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1173 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1174 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1176 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1178 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1179 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1181 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1183 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1185 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1191 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1192 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1193 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1194 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1195 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1197 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1199 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1200 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1201 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1203 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1204 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1205 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1206 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1207 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1208 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1209 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1211 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1214 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1216 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1218 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1221 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1224 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1225 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1230 char *buffer, *path;
1232 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1236 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1240 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1241 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1242 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1243 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1247 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1249 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1253 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1261 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1262 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1264 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1265 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1267 struct dentry *dentry;
1268 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1269 char *context = NULL;
1273 if (isec->initialized)
1276 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1277 if (isec->initialized)
1280 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1281 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1282 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1283 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1284 server is ready to handle calls. */
1285 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1286 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1287 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1288 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1292 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1293 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1296 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1297 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1301 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1302 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1304 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1305 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1307 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1308 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1312 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1313 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1314 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1315 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1316 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1317 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1318 * be used again by userspace.
1323 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1324 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1330 context[len] = '\0';
1331 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1333 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1336 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1337 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1344 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1350 context[len] = '\0';
1351 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1357 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1358 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1359 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1360 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1364 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1365 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1368 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1372 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1373 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1375 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1376 if (printk_ratelimit())
1377 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1378 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1379 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1382 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1383 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1386 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1394 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1395 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1397 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1398 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1399 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1401 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1402 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1403 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1404 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1409 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1410 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1413 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1414 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1416 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1417 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1420 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1421 * d_splice_alias. */
1422 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1424 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1426 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1428 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1429 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1430 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1431 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1432 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1433 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1434 * could be used again by userspace.
1438 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1439 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
1448 isec->initialized = 1;
1451 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1453 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1454 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1458 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1459 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1465 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1466 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1469 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1470 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1473 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1474 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1477 /* All other signals. */
1478 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1486 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1487 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1489 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1490 const struct cred *target,
1493 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1495 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1499 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1500 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1501 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1502 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1504 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1505 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1508 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1512 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1513 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1515 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1519 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1520 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1521 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1522 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1524 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1529 sid = current_sid();
1530 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1531 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1534 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1535 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1538 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1539 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1542 struct common_audit_data ad;
1543 struct av_decision avd;
1545 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1546 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1549 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1552 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1554 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1557 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1561 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1566 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1567 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1568 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1575 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1576 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1579 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1581 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1582 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1585 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1586 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1587 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1588 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1589 struct inode *inode,
1591 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1593 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1596 validate_creds(cred);
1598 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1601 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1602 isec = inode->i_security;
1604 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1607 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1608 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1609 pathname if needed. */
1610 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1611 struct dentry *dentry,
1614 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1615 struct common_audit_data ad;
1617 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1618 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1619 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1622 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1623 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1624 pathname if needed. */
1625 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1626 const struct path *path,
1629 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1630 struct common_audit_data ad;
1632 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1634 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1637 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1638 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1642 struct common_audit_data ad;
1644 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1645 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1646 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1649 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1650 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1651 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1652 check a particular permission to the file.
1653 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1654 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1655 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1656 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1657 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1661 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1662 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1663 struct common_audit_data ad;
1664 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1667 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1668 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1670 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1671 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1679 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1682 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1688 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1689 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1690 struct dentry *dentry,
1693 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1694 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1695 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1697 struct common_audit_data ad;
1700 dsec = dir->i_security;
1701 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1704 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1706 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1707 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1709 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1710 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1715 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
1716 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1717 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1722 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1726 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1727 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1728 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1731 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1732 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1733 struct task_struct *ctx)
1735 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1737 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1741 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1744 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1745 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1746 struct dentry *dentry,
1750 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1751 struct common_audit_data ad;
1752 u32 sid = current_sid();
1756 dsec = dir->i_security;
1757 isec = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1759 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1760 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1763 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1764 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1779 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1784 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1788 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1789 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1790 struct inode *new_dir,
1791 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1793 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1794 struct common_audit_data ad;
1795 u32 sid = current_sid();
1797 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1800 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1801 old_isec = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_security;
1802 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1803 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1805 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1807 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1808 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1809 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1812 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1813 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1816 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1817 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1818 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1823 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1824 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1825 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1826 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1827 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1830 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1831 new_isec = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_security;
1832 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1833 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1835 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1843 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1844 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1845 struct super_block *sb,
1847 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1849 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1850 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1852 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1853 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1856 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1857 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1861 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1862 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1863 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1864 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1867 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1869 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1873 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1875 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1877 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1884 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1885 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1889 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1891 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1892 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1899 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1908 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1911 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1913 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1915 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1921 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1923 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
1925 u32 mysid = current_sid();
1926 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
1928 return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
1929 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
1932 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
1933 struct task_struct *to)
1935 u32 mysid = current_sid();
1936 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
1937 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
1940 if (mysid != fromsid) {
1941 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
1942 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
1947 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
1951 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
1952 struct task_struct *to)
1954 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
1955 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
1957 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
1961 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
1962 struct task_struct *to,
1965 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
1966 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1967 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
1968 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1969 struct common_audit_data ad;
1972 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1973 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1975 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1976 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1984 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1987 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
1991 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1996 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
2000 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
2001 u32 sid = current_sid();
2002 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2003 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2006 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2009 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2013 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
2017 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2020 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2021 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2025 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
2029 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
2032 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2033 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2034 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2035 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2039 error = cap_capset(new, old,
2040 effective, inheritable, permitted);
2044 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
2048 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2049 * which was removed).
2051 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2052 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2053 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2054 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2057 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2062 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
2066 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
2069 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2071 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2083 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2088 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2091 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2097 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2099 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2101 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2104 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2109 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2110 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2111 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2113 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2114 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2115 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2116 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2117 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2119 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2120 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2121 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2122 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2123 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2125 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2132 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2133 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2134 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2136 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2137 * processes that allocate mappings.
2139 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2141 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2143 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2144 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2148 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2151 /* binprm security operations */
2153 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2154 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2155 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2157 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2158 int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
2161 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2162 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2164 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2165 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2168 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2169 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2170 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2171 * of the current SID.
2173 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2176 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2177 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2178 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2188 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2190 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2191 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2192 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2193 struct common_audit_data ad;
2194 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2197 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2201 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2202 * the script interpreter */
2203 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2206 old_tsec = current_security();
2207 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2208 isec = inode->i_security;
2210 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2211 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2212 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2214 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2215 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2216 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2217 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2219 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2220 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2221 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2222 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2224 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2225 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2229 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2230 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2231 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2237 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2240 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2242 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2245 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2246 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2248 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2249 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2250 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2254 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2255 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2256 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2260 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2261 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2265 /* Check for shared state */
2266 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2267 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2268 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2274 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2275 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2277 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2278 struct task_struct *tracer;
2279 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2283 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2284 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2285 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2291 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2293 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2299 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2300 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2306 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2308 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2316 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2317 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2318 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2319 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2321 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2324 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2327 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2329 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2332 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2333 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2334 struct files_struct *files)
2336 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2337 struct tty_struct *tty;
2341 tty = get_current_tty();
2343 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2344 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2345 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2347 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2348 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2349 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2350 open file may belong to another process and we are
2351 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2352 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2353 struct tty_file_private, list);
2354 file = file_priv->file;
2355 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2358 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2361 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2365 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2366 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2367 if (!n) /* none found? */
2370 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2371 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2373 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2375 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2376 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2382 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2384 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2386 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2387 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2390 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2391 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2394 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2395 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2397 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2398 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2400 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2401 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2402 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2404 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2405 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2406 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2407 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2408 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2410 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2411 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2413 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2415 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2416 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2417 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2418 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2420 task_unlock(current);
2421 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2426 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2429 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2431 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2432 struct itimerval itimer;
2442 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2443 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2444 * flush and unblock signals.
2446 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2447 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2449 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2451 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2452 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2453 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2454 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2455 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2456 __flush_signals(current);
2457 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2458 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2460 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2463 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2464 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2465 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2466 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2467 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2470 /* superblock security operations */
2472 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2474 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2477 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2479 superblock_free_security(sb);
2482 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2487 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2490 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2492 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2493 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2494 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2495 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2496 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2499 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2506 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2510 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2513 int current_size = 0;
2521 while (current_size < len) {
2531 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2533 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2534 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2535 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2541 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2549 in_save = in_end = orig;
2553 open_quote = !open_quote;
2554 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2556 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2558 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2559 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2561 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2563 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2565 } while (*in_end++);
2567 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2568 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2573 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2576 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2577 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2578 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2580 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2586 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2589 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2590 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2593 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2595 goto out_free_secdata;
2597 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2599 goto out_free_secdata;
2601 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2602 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2604 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2608 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2610 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2611 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
2614 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2615 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2616 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2622 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2623 goto out_bad_option;
2626 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2627 goto out_bad_option;
2629 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2630 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2631 root_isec = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root)->i_security;
2633 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2634 goto out_bad_option;
2637 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2638 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2639 goto out_bad_option;
2648 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2650 free_secdata(secdata);
2653 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2654 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2659 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2661 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2662 struct common_audit_data ad;
2665 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2669 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2670 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2673 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2674 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2675 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2678 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2680 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2681 struct common_audit_data ad;
2683 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2684 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2685 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2688 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2691 unsigned long flags,
2694 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2696 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2697 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2698 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2700 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2703 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2705 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2707 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2708 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2711 /* inode security operations */
2713 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2715 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2718 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2720 inode_free_security(inode);
2723 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2724 struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2727 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2728 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2729 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2730 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2731 struct inode *dir = d_backing_inode(dentry->d_parent);
2735 tsec = cred->security;
2736 dsec = dir->i_security;
2737 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2739 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2740 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2742 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2743 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2748 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2754 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2757 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2758 const struct qstr *qstr,
2760 void **value, size_t *len)
2762 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2763 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2764 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2765 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2769 dsec = dir->i_security;
2770 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2773 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2775 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2776 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2777 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2778 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
2779 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2780 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2783 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2784 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2787 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2792 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2793 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2794 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2795 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2797 isec->initialized = 1;
2800 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2804 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2807 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2817 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2819 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2822 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2824 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2827 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2829 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2832 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2834 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2837 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2839 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2842 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2844 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2847 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2849 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2852 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2853 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2855 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2858 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2860 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2862 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2865 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2867 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2869 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2872 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2873 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2877 struct common_audit_data ad;
2878 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2881 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2884 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2885 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
2891 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2893 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2896 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2897 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2899 struct av_decision avd;
2901 u32 audited, denied;
2903 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2904 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2906 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2910 validate_creds(cred);
2912 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2915 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2917 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2918 isec = inode->i_security;
2920 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2921 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2922 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2924 if (likely(!audited))
2927 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
2933 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2935 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2936 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2937 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2939 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2940 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2941 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2947 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2948 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2949 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2951 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2954 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2957 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
2959 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
2962 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2964 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2966 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2967 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2968 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2969 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2971 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2972 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2973 Restrict to administrator. */
2978 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2979 ordinary setattr permission. */
2980 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2983 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2984 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2986 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2987 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2988 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2989 struct common_audit_data ad;
2990 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2993 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2994 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2996 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2997 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3000 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3003 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3004 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3006 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3007 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3011 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3012 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3013 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3014 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3018 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3019 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3022 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3023 audit_size = size - 1;
3030 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3031 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3032 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3037 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3042 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3043 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3047 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
3052 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3054 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3055 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3059 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3060 const void *value, size_t size,
3063 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3064 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3068 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3069 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3073 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3075 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3076 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3077 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3081 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3083 isec->initialized = 1;
3088 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3090 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3092 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3095 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3097 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3099 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3102 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3104 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3105 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3107 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3108 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3113 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3115 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3117 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3121 char *context = NULL;
3122 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3124 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3128 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3129 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3130 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3131 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3132 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3133 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3134 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3136 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3137 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3139 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3142 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3155 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3156 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3158 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3162 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3165 if (!value || !size)
3168 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3172 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3174 isec->initialized = 1;
3178 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3180 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3181 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3182 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3186 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3188 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3192 /* file security operations */
3194 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3196 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3197 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3199 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3200 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3203 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3204 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3207 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3209 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3210 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3211 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3212 u32 sid = current_sid();
3215 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3218 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3219 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3220 /* No change since file_open check. */
3223 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3226 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3228 return file_alloc_security(file);
3231 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3233 file_free_security(file);
3236 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3239 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3249 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3251 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3252 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3255 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3257 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3258 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3261 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3265 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3270 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3271 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3274 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3275 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3278 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3283 static int default_noexec;
3285 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3287 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3290 if (default_noexec &&
3291 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3293 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3294 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3295 * This has an additional check.
3297 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3303 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3304 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3306 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3307 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3310 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3311 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3313 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3320 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3324 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3325 rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3329 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3330 u32 sid = current_sid();
3331 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3332 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3338 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3339 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3341 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3344 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3345 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3348 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3349 unsigned long reqprot,
3352 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3354 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3357 if (default_noexec &&
3358 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3360 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3361 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3362 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3363 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3364 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3365 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3366 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3367 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3369 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3370 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3371 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3372 * modified content. This typically should only
3373 * occur for text relocations.
3375 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3381 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3384 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3386 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3388 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3391 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3394 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3399 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3400 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3409 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3410 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3411 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3419 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3424 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3431 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3433 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3435 fsec = file->f_security;
3436 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3439 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3440 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3443 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3445 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3447 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3448 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3450 fsec = file->f_security;
3453 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3455 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3457 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3458 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3461 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3463 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3465 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3468 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3470 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3471 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3473 fsec = file->f_security;
3474 isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3476 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3477 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3478 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3479 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3480 * struct as its SID.
3482 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3483 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3485 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3486 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3487 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3488 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3489 * new inode label or new policy.
3490 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3492 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3495 /* task security operations */
3497 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3499 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3503 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3505 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3507 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3509 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3513 cred->security = tsec;
3518 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3520 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3522 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3525 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3526 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3528 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3529 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3534 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3536 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3539 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3540 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3542 old_tsec = old->security;
3544 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3548 new->security = tsec;
3553 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3555 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3557 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3558 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3564 * set the security data for a kernel service
3565 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3567 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3569 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3570 u32 sid = current_sid();
3573 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3574 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3575 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3579 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3580 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3581 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3587 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3588 * objective context of the specified inode
3590 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3592 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3593 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3594 u32 sid = current_sid();
3597 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3598 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3599 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3603 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3607 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3610 struct common_audit_data ad;
3612 sid = task_sid(current);
3614 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3615 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3617 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3618 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3621 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3623 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3626 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3628 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3631 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3633 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3636 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3638 *secid = task_sid(p);
3641 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3645 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3649 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3652 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3656 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3660 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3663 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3665 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3668 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3669 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3671 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3673 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3674 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3675 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3676 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3677 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3678 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3683 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3687 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3691 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3694 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3696 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3699 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3701 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3704 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3711 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3713 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3715 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3716 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3718 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3722 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3724 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3727 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3728 struct inode *inode)
3730 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3731 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3734 isec->initialized = 1;
3737 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3738 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3739 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3741 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3742 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3744 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3745 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3749 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3750 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3753 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3754 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3758 *proto = ih->protocol;
3760 switch (ih->protocol) {
3762 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3764 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3768 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3772 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3773 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3778 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3780 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3784 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3788 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3789 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3793 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3794 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3796 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3800 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3804 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3805 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3816 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3818 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3819 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3820 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3823 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3824 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3827 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3828 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3832 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3833 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3836 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3837 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3838 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3847 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3849 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3853 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3854 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3859 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3861 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3865 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3866 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3870 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3871 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3873 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3877 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3878 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3882 /* includes fragments */
3892 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3893 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3898 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3900 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3903 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3904 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3907 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3909 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3912 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3913 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3923 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3924 " unable to parse packet\n");
3934 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3936 * @family: protocol family
3937 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3940 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3941 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3942 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3943 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3944 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3948 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3955 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3958 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3962 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3963 if (unlikely(err)) {
3965 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3966 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3974 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3975 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3976 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3977 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3979 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3980 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3981 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3982 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3985 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
3989 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
3990 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
3997 /* socket security operations */
3999 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4000 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4002 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4003 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4007 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
4011 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4013 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4014 struct common_audit_data ad;
4015 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4016 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
4018 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4021 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4025 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4028 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4029 int protocol, int kern)
4031 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4039 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4040 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4044 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4047 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4048 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4050 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4051 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4052 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4055 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4058 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4060 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
4065 isec->initialized = 1;
4068 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4069 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
4070 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4071 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4077 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4078 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4079 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4081 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4083 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4087 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4092 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4093 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4094 * check the first address now.
4096 family = sk->sk_family;
4097 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4099 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4100 struct common_audit_data ad;
4101 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4102 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4103 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4104 unsigned short snum;
4107 if (family == PF_INET) {
4108 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4109 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4110 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4112 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4113 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4114 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4120 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4122 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4123 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4127 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4129 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4130 ad.u.net->family = family;
4131 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4133 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4139 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4140 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4141 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4144 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4145 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4148 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4149 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4153 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4157 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4161 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4163 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4164 ad.u.net->family = family;
4166 if (family == PF_INET)
4167 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4169 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4171 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4172 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4180 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4182 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4183 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4186 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4191 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4193 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4194 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4195 struct common_audit_data ad;
4196 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4197 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4198 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4199 unsigned short snum;
4202 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4203 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4204 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4206 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4208 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4209 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4211 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4214 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4218 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4219 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4221 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4223 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4224 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4225 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4230 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4236 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4238 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4241 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4244 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4245 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4247 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4251 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4253 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4254 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4255 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4256 newisec->initialized = 1;
4261 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4264 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4267 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4268 int size, int flags)
4270 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4273 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4275 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4278 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4280 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4283 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4287 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4291 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4294 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4297 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4300 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4302 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4305 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4309 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4310 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4311 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4312 struct common_audit_data ad;
4313 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4316 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4318 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4320 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4321 sksec_other->sclass,
4322 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4326 /* server child socket */
4327 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4328 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4333 /* connecting socket */
4334 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4339 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4340 struct socket *other)
4342 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4343 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4344 struct common_audit_data ad;
4345 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4347 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4349 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4351 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4355 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4356 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4357 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4363 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4366 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4367 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4371 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4374 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4375 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4378 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4382 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4383 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4384 struct common_audit_data ad;
4385 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4388 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4390 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4391 ad.u.net->family = family;
4392 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4396 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4397 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4403 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4406 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4411 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4414 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4415 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4416 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4417 struct common_audit_data ad;
4418 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4423 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4426 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4427 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4430 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4431 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4432 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4433 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4434 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4435 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4437 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4438 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4439 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4442 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4444 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4445 ad.u.net->family = family;
4446 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4450 if (peerlbl_active) {
4453 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4456 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4457 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4459 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4462 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4465 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4470 if (secmark_active) {
4471 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4480 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4481 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4486 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4487 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4489 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4490 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4491 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4492 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4493 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4495 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4499 if (scontext_len > len) {
4504 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4508 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4514 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4516 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4519 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4521 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4524 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4528 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4529 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4531 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4534 *secid = peer_secid;
4535 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4540 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4542 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4544 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4548 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4549 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4550 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4551 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4556 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4558 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4560 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4561 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4565 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4567 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4568 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4570 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4571 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4572 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4574 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4577 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4580 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4582 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4584 *secid = sksec->sid;
4588 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4590 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4591 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4593 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4594 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4595 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4596 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4599 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4600 struct request_sock *req)
4602 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4604 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4608 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4611 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4614 req->secid = connsid;
4615 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4617 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4620 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4621 const struct request_sock *req)
4623 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4625 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4626 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4627 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4628 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4629 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4630 time it will have been created and available. */
4632 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4633 * thread with access to newsksec */
4634 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4637 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4639 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4640 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4642 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4643 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4646 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4649 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4651 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4654 __tsec = current_security();
4657 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4660 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4662 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4665 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4667 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4670 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4673 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4676 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4678 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4680 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4683 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4689 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4694 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4696 u32 sid = current_sid();
4698 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4699 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4700 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4701 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4702 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4703 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4705 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4709 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4711 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4713 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4714 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4717 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4719 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4720 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4722 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4723 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4724 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4725 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4726 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4727 * protocols were being used */
4729 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4730 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4735 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4737 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4738 u32 sid = current_sid();
4741 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4742 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4745 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4746 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4754 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4758 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4759 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4761 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4765 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4767 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4769 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4771 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4772 " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
4773 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4774 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4784 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4789 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4791 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
4792 const struct net_device *indev,
4798 struct common_audit_data ad;
4799 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4804 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4807 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4808 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4809 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4810 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4813 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4816 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4818 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
4819 ad.u.net->family = family;
4820 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4823 if (peerlbl_active) {
4824 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
4825 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4827 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4833 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4834 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4838 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4839 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4840 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4842 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4848 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4849 struct sk_buff *skb,
4850 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4852 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
4855 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4856 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4857 struct sk_buff *skb,
4858 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4860 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
4864 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4870 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4873 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4874 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4875 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4878 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4880 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
4881 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4882 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4883 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4884 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4885 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4886 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4887 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4888 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4889 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4890 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4891 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4892 * best we can do. */
4895 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4896 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4899 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4900 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4906 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4907 struct sk_buff *skb,
4908 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4910 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4913 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4917 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4918 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4919 struct common_audit_data ad;
4920 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4926 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4928 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4930 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4931 ad.u.net->family = family;
4932 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4935 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4936 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4937 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4938 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4940 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4941 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4946 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
4947 const struct net_device *outdev,
4952 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
4954 struct common_audit_data ad;
4955 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4960 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4961 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4962 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4963 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4964 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4965 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4967 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4968 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4969 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4975 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4976 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4977 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4978 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4979 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4980 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4981 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4982 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4983 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4984 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4986 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
4987 !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
4992 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4993 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4994 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4995 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4997 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4998 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5001 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5002 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5004 } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
5005 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5006 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5007 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5008 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5009 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5010 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5011 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5012 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5013 * for similar problems. */
5015 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5016 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5018 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5019 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5020 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5021 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5022 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5023 * pass the packet. */
5024 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5027 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5031 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5035 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5038 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5040 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5042 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5043 * associated socket. */
5044 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5045 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5046 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5049 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5051 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5052 ad.u.net->family = family;
5053 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5057 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5058 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5059 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5061 if (peerlbl_active) {
5065 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5067 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5068 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5069 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5071 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5073 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5074 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5075 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5081 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5082 struct sk_buff *skb,
5083 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5085 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5088 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5089 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5090 struct sk_buff *skb,
5091 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5093 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5097 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5099 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5103 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
5107 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5110 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5111 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5114 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5117 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5121 sid = task_sid(task);
5122 isec->sclass = sclass;
5124 perm->security = isec;
5129 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5131 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5132 perm->security = NULL;
5136 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5138 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5140 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5144 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5145 msg->security = msec;
5150 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5152 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5154 msg->security = NULL;
5158 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5161 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5162 struct common_audit_data ad;
5163 u32 sid = current_sid();
5165 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5167 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5168 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5170 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5173 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5175 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5178 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5180 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5183 /* message queue security operations */
5184 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5186 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5187 struct common_audit_data ad;
5188 u32 sid = current_sid();
5191 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5195 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5197 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5198 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5200 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5203 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5209 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5211 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5214 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5216 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5217 struct common_audit_data ad;
5218 u32 sid = current_sid();
5220 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5222 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5223 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5225 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5226 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5229 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5237 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5238 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5241 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5244 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5247 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5253 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5257 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5259 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5260 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5261 struct common_audit_data ad;
5262 u32 sid = current_sid();
5265 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5266 msec = msg->security;
5269 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5271 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5273 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5274 * message queue this message will be stored in
5276 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5282 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5283 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5285 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5286 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5289 /* Can this process send the message */
5290 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5293 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5294 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5295 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5300 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5301 struct task_struct *target,
5302 long type, int mode)
5304 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5305 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5306 struct common_audit_data ad;
5307 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5310 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5311 msec = msg->security;
5313 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5314 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5316 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5317 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5319 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5320 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5324 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5325 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5327 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5328 struct common_audit_data ad;
5329 u32 sid = current_sid();
5332 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5336 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5338 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5339 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5341 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5344 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5350 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5352 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5355 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5357 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5358 struct common_audit_data ad;
5359 u32 sid = current_sid();
5361 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5363 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5364 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5366 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5367 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5370 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5371 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5379 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5380 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5383 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5386 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5393 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5399 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5403 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5404 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5408 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5411 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5413 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5416 /* Semaphore security operations */
5417 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5419 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5420 struct common_audit_data ad;
5421 u32 sid = current_sid();
5424 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5428 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5430 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5431 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5433 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5436 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5442 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5444 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5447 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5449 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5450 struct common_audit_data ad;
5451 u32 sid = current_sid();
5453 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5455 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5456 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5458 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5459 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5462 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5463 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5471 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5472 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5476 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5487 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5490 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5494 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5500 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5504 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5505 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5510 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5514 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5517 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5523 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5525 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5530 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5533 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5535 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5539 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5542 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5545 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5546 char *name, char **value)
5548 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5554 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5560 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5562 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5564 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5566 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5567 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5568 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5569 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5570 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5571 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5572 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5573 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5581 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5591 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5592 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5594 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5595 struct task_struct *tracer;
5602 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5603 security attributes. */
5608 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5609 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5610 * above restriction is ever removed.
5612 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5613 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5614 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5615 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5616 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5617 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5618 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5619 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5620 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5621 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5627 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5628 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5629 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5633 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5634 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5635 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5636 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5639 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5640 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5641 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5642 audit_size = size - 1;
5645 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5646 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5647 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5652 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5659 new = prepare_creds();
5663 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5664 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5665 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5666 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5667 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5668 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5669 tsec = new->security;
5670 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5671 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5672 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5673 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5674 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5675 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5678 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5679 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5680 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5681 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5686 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5688 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5689 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5694 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5695 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5696 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5700 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5701 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5704 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5706 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5710 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5711 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5730 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5732 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5735 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5737 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5740 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5742 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
5745 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5751 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5753 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5755 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5759 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5761 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5763 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5766 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5769 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5778 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5779 unsigned long flags)
5781 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5782 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5784 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5788 tsec = cred->security;
5789 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5790 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5792 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5798 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5800 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5806 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5807 const struct cred *cred,
5811 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5814 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5815 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5816 appear to be created. */
5820 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5822 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5823 ksec = key->security;
5825 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5828 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5830 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5831 char *context = NULL;
5835 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5844 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5847 .binder_set_context_mgr = selinux_binder_set_context_mgr,
5848 .binder_transaction = selinux_binder_transaction,
5849 .binder_transfer_binder = selinux_binder_transfer_binder,
5850 .binder_transfer_file = selinux_binder_transfer_file,
5852 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5853 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5854 .capget = selinux_capget,
5855 .capset = selinux_capset,
5856 .capable = selinux_capable,
5857 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5858 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5859 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5860 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5862 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5864 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5865 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5866 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5867 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5869 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5870 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5871 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5872 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5873 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5874 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5875 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5876 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5877 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5878 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5879 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5880 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5882 .dentry_init_security = selinux_dentry_init_security,
5884 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5885 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5886 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5887 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5888 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5889 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5890 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5891 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5892 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5893 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5894 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5895 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5896 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5897 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5898 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5899 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5900 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5901 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5902 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5903 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5904 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5905 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5906 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5907 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5908 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5910 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5911 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5912 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5913 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5914 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5915 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5916 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5917 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5918 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5919 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5920 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5921 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5923 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5925 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5926 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5927 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5928 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5929 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5930 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5931 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5932 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5933 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5934 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5935 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5936 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5937 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5938 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5939 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5940 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5941 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5942 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5943 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5944 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5945 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5946 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5948 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5949 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5951 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5952 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5954 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5955 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5956 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5957 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5958 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5959 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5961 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5962 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5963 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5964 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5965 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5967 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5968 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5969 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5970 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5971 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5973 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5975 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5976 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5978 .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel,
5979 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5980 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5981 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5982 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5983 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5984 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5986 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5987 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5989 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5990 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5991 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5992 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5993 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5994 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5995 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5996 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5997 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5998 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5999 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
6000 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
6001 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
6002 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
6003 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
6004 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
6005 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
6006 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
6007 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
6008 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
6009 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
6010 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
6011 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
6012 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
6013 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
6014 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
6015 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
6016 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
6017 .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
6018 .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
6019 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
6020 .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
6021 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
6022 .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
6024 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6025 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
6026 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
6027 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
6028 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
6029 .xfrm_state_alloc = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
6030 .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
6031 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
6032 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
6033 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
6034 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
6035 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
6039 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
6040 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
6041 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
6042 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
6046 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
6047 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
6048 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
6049 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
6053 static __init int selinux_init(void)
6055 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
6056 selinux_enabled = 0;
6060 if (!selinux_enabled) {
6061 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6065 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6067 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6068 cred_init_security();
6070 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6072 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6073 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6074 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6077 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
6078 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
6080 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6081 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6083 if (selinux_enforcing)
6084 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6086 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6091 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6093 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6096 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6098 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6100 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6101 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6102 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6105 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6106 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6107 security_initcall(selinux_init);
6109 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6111 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6113 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6114 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6116 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6117 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6120 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
6121 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6123 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6124 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6127 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
6128 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6130 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6131 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6133 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6135 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6136 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6138 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6139 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6142 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
6143 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6145 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6146 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6151 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6155 if (!selinux_enabled)
6158 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6160 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6162 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
6167 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6169 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6170 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6172 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6174 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6178 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6180 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6181 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6184 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6186 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6187 static int selinux_disabled;
6189 int selinux_disable(void)
6191 if (ss_initialized) {
6192 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6196 if (selinux_disabled) {
6197 /* Only do this once. */
6201 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6203 selinux_disabled = 1;
6204 selinux_enabled = 0;
6206 reset_security_ops();
6208 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6211 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6212 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6214 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */