Add the rt linux 4.1.3-rt3 as base
[kvmfornfv.git] / kernel / crypto / asymmetric_keys / pkcs7_trust.c
1 /* Validate the trust chain of a PKCS#7 message.
2  *
3  * Copyright (C) 2012 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
4  * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com)
5  *
6  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
7  * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public Licence
8  * as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
9  * 2 of the Licence, or (at your option) any later version.
10  */
11
12 #define pr_fmt(fmt) "PKCS7: "fmt
13 #include <linux/kernel.h>
14 #include <linux/export.h>
15 #include <linux/slab.h>
16 #include <linux/err.h>
17 #include <linux/asn1.h>
18 #include <linux/key.h>
19 #include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
20 #include "public_key.h"
21 #include "pkcs7_parser.h"
22
23 /**
24  * Check the trust on one PKCS#7 SignedInfo block.
25  */
26 static int pkcs7_validate_trust_one(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
27                                     struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo,
28                                     struct key *trust_keyring)
29 {
30         struct public_key_signature *sig = &sinfo->sig;
31         struct x509_certificate *x509, *last = NULL, *p;
32         struct key *key;
33         bool trusted;
34         int ret;
35
36         kenter(",%u,", sinfo->index);
37
38         if (sinfo->unsupported_crypto) {
39                 kleave(" = -ENOPKG [cached]");
40                 return -ENOPKG;
41         }
42
43         for (x509 = sinfo->signer; x509; x509 = x509->signer) {
44                 if (x509->seen) {
45                         if (x509->verified) {
46                                 trusted = x509->trusted;
47                                 goto verified;
48                         }
49                         kleave(" = -ENOKEY [cached]");
50                         return -ENOKEY;
51                 }
52                 x509->seen = true;
53
54                 /* Look to see if this certificate is present in the trusted
55                  * keys.
56                  */
57                 key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, x509->id,
58                                                   false);
59                 if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
60                         /* One of the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message
61                          * is apparently the same as one we already trust.
62                          * Verify that the trusted variant can also validate
63                          * the signature on the descendant.
64                          */
65                         pr_devel("sinfo %u: Cert %u as key %x\n",
66                                  sinfo->index, x509->index, key_serial(key));
67                         goto matched;
68                 }
69                 if (key == ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM))
70                         return -ENOMEM;
71
72                  /* Self-signed certificates form roots of their own, and if we
73                   * don't know them, then we can't accept them.
74                   */
75                 if (x509->next == x509) {
76                         kleave(" = -ENOKEY [unknown self-signed]");
77                         return -ENOKEY;
78                 }
79
80                 might_sleep();
81                 last = x509;
82                 sig = &last->sig;
83         }
84
85         /* No match - see if the root certificate has a signer amongst the
86          * trusted keys.
87          */
88         if (last && last->authority) {
89                 key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring, last->authority,
90                                                   false);
91                 if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
92                         x509 = last;
93                         pr_devel("sinfo %u: Root cert %u signer is key %x\n",
94                                  sinfo->index, x509->index, key_serial(key));
95                         goto matched;
96                 }
97                 if (PTR_ERR(key) != -ENOKEY)
98                         return PTR_ERR(key);
99         }
100
101         /* As a last resort, see if we have a trusted public key that matches
102          * the signed info directly.
103          */
104         key = x509_request_asymmetric_key(trust_keyring,
105                                           sinfo->signing_cert_id,
106                                           false);
107         if (!IS_ERR(key)) {
108                 pr_devel("sinfo %u: Direct signer is key %x\n",
109                          sinfo->index, key_serial(key));
110                 x509 = NULL;
111                 goto matched;
112         }
113         if (PTR_ERR(key) != -ENOKEY)
114                 return PTR_ERR(key);
115
116         kleave(" = -ENOKEY [no backref]");
117         return -ENOKEY;
118
119 matched:
120         ret = verify_signature(key, sig);
121         trusted = test_bit(KEY_FLAG_TRUSTED, &key->flags);
122         key_put(key);
123         if (ret < 0) {
124                 if (ret == -ENOMEM)
125                         return ret;
126                 kleave(" = -EKEYREJECTED [verify %d]", ret);
127                 return -EKEYREJECTED;
128         }
129
130 verified:
131         if (x509) {
132                 x509->verified = true;
133                 for (p = sinfo->signer; p != x509; p = p->signer) {
134                         p->verified = true;
135                         p->trusted = trusted;
136                 }
137         }
138         sinfo->trusted = trusted;
139         kleave(" = 0");
140         return 0;
141 }
142
143 /**
144  * pkcs7_validate_trust - Validate PKCS#7 trust chain
145  * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 certificate to validate
146  * @trust_keyring: Signing certificates to use as starting points
147  * @_trusted: Set to true if trustworth, false otherwise
148  *
149  * Validate that the certificate chain inside the PKCS#7 message intersects
150  * keys we already know and trust.
151  *
152  * Returns, in order of descending priority:
153  *
154  *  (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we have a valid
155  *      key, or:
156  *
157  *  (*) 0 if at least one signature chain intersects with the keys in the trust
158  *      keyring, or:
159  *
160  *  (*) -ENOPKG if a suitable crypto module couldn't be found for a check on a
161  *      chain.
162  *
163  *  (*) -ENOKEY if we couldn't find a match for any of the signature chains in
164  *      the message.
165  *
166  * May also return -ENOMEM.
167  */
168 int pkcs7_validate_trust(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
169                          struct key *trust_keyring,
170                          bool *_trusted)
171 {
172         struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
173         struct x509_certificate *p;
174         int cached_ret = -ENOKEY;
175         int ret;
176
177         for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next)
178                 p->seen = false;
179
180         for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
181                 ret = pkcs7_validate_trust_one(pkcs7, sinfo, trust_keyring);
182                 switch (ret) {
183                 case -ENOKEY:
184                         continue;
185                 case -ENOPKG:
186                         if (cached_ret == -ENOKEY)
187                                 cached_ret = -ENOPKG;
188                         continue;
189                 case 0:
190                         *_trusted |= sinfo->trusted;
191                         cached_ret = 0;
192                         continue;
193                 default:
194                         return ret;
195                 }
196         }
197
198         return cached_ret;
199 }
200 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_validate_trust);