sinfo->sig.digest_size = digest_size = crypto_shash_digestsize(tfm);
ret = -ENOMEM;
- digest = kzalloc(digest_size + desc_size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ digest = kzalloc(ALIGN(digest_size, __alignof__(*desc)) + desc_size,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
if (!digest)
goto error_no_desc;
- desc = digest + digest_size;
+ desc = PTR_ALIGN(digest + digest_size, __alignof__(*desc));
desc->tfm = tfm;
desc->flags = CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP;
* message digest attribute amongst them which corresponds to the
* digest we just calculated.
*/
- if (sinfo->msgdigest) {
+ if (sinfo->authattrs) {
u8 tag;
+ if (!sinfo->msgdigest) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: No messageDigest\n", sinfo->index);
+ ret = -EKEYREJECTED;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
if (sinfo->msgdigest_len != sinfo->sig.digest_size) {
pr_debug("Sig %u: Invalid digest size (%u)\n",
sinfo->index, sinfo->msgdigest_len);
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo)
{
struct x509_certificate *x509 = sinfo->signer, *p;
+ struct asymmetric_key_id *auth;
int ret;
kenter("");
goto maybe_missing_crypto_in_x509;
pr_debug("- issuer %s\n", x509->issuer);
- if (x509->authority)
- pr_debug("- authkeyid %*phN\n",
- x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
-
- if (!x509->authority ||
+ if (x509->akid_id)
+ pr_debug("- authkeyid.id %*phN\n",
+ x509->akid_id->len, x509->akid_id->data);
+ if (x509->akid_skid)
+ pr_debug("- authkeyid.skid %*phN\n",
+ x509->akid_skid->len, x509->akid_skid->data);
+
+ if ((!x509->akid_id && !x509->akid_skid) ||
strcmp(x509->subject, x509->issuer) == 0) {
/* If there's no authority certificate specified, then
* the certificate must be self-signed and is the root
/* Look through the X.509 certificates in the PKCS#7 message's
* list to see if the next one is there.
*/
- pr_debug("- want %*phN\n",
- x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
- for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
- if (!p->skid)
- continue;
- pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
- p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
- if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->authority))
- goto found_issuer;
+ auth = x509->akid_id;
+ if (auth) {
+ pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+ pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+ p->index, p->id->len, p->id->data);
+ if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->id, auth))
+ goto found_issuer_check_skid;
+ }
+ } else {
+ auth = x509->akid_skid;
+ pr_debug("- want %*phN\n", auth->len, auth->data);
+ for (p = pkcs7->certs; p; p = p->next) {
+ if (!p->skid)
+ continue;
+ pr_debug("- cmp [%u] %*phN\n",
+ p->index, p->skid->len, p->skid->data);
+ if (asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, auth))
+ goto found_issuer;
+ }
}
/* We didn't find the root of this chain */
pr_debug("- top\n");
return 0;
+ found_issuer_check_skid:
+ /* We matched issuer + serialNumber, but if there's an
+ * authKeyId.keyId, that must match the CA subjKeyId also.
+ */
+ if (x509->akid_skid &&
+ !asymmetric_key_id_same(p->skid, x509->akid_skid)) {
+ pr_warn("Sig %u: X.509 chain contains auth-skid nonmatch (%u->%u)\n",
+ sinfo->index, x509->index, p->index);
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
found_issuer:
pr_debug("- subject %s\n", p->subject);
if (p->seen) {
pr_devel("Using X.509[%u] for sig %u\n",
sinfo->signer->index, sinfo->index);
+ /* Check that the PKCS#7 signing time is valid according to the X.509
+ * certificate. We can't, however, check against the system clock
+ * since that may not have been set yet and may be wrong.
+ */
+ if (test_bit(sinfo_has_signing_time, &sinfo->aa_set)) {
+ if (sinfo->signing_time < sinfo->signer->valid_from ||
+ sinfo->signing_time > sinfo->signer->valid_to) {
+ pr_warn("Message signed outside of X.509 validity window\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Verify the PKCS#7 binary against the key */
ret = public_key_verify_signature(sinfo->signer->pub, &sinfo->sig);
if (ret < 0)
/**
* pkcs7_verify - Verify a PKCS#7 message
* @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message to be verified
+ * @usage: The use to which the key is being put
*
* Verify a PKCS#7 message is internally consistent - that is, the data digest
* matches the digest in the AuthAttrs and any signature in the message or one
*
* Returns, in order of descending priority:
*
+ * (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a key was selected that had a usage restriction at
+ * odds with the specified usage, or:
+ *
* (*) -EKEYREJECTED if a signature failed to match for which we found an
* appropriate X.509 certificate, or:
*
* (*) 0 if all the signature chains that don't incur -ENOPKG can be verified
* (note that a signature chain may be of zero length), or:
*/
-int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7)
+int pkcs7_verify(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ enum key_being_used_for usage)
{
struct pkcs7_signed_info *sinfo;
struct x509_certificate *x509;
kenter("");
+ switch (usage) {
+ case VERIFYING_MODULE_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid module sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ if (pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid module sig (has authattrs)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ case VERIFYING_FIRMWARE_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ if (!pkcs7->have_authattrs) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid firmware sig (missing authattrs)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ case VERIFYING_KEXEC_PE_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_msIndirectData) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid kexec sig (not Authenticode)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ /* Authattr presence checked in parser */
+ break;
+ case VERIFYING_UNSPECIFIED_SIGNATURE:
+ if (pkcs7->data_type != OID_data) {
+ pr_warn("Invalid unspecified sig (not pkcs7-data)\n");
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
for (n = 0, x509 = pkcs7->certs; x509; x509 = x509->next, n++) {
ret = x509_get_sig_params(x509);
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- pr_debug("X.509[%u] %*phN\n",
- n, x509->authority->len, x509->authority->data);
}
for (sinfo = pkcs7->signed_infos; sinfo; sinfo = sinfo->next) {
return enopkg;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(pkcs7_verify);
+
+/**
+ * pkcs7_supply_detached_data - Supply the data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message
+ * @pkcs7: The PKCS#7 message
+ * @data: The data to be verified
+ * @datalen: The amount of data
+ *
+ * Supply the detached data needed to verify a PKCS#7 message. Note that no
+ * attempt to retain/pin the data is made. That is left to the caller. The
+ * data will not be modified by pkcs7_verify() and will not be freed when the
+ * PKCS#7 message is freed.
+ *
+ * Returns -EINVAL if data is already supplied in the message, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int pkcs7_supply_detached_data(struct pkcs7_message *pkcs7,
+ const void *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ if (pkcs7->data) {
+ pr_debug("Data already supplied\n");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ pkcs7->data = data;
+ pkcs7->data_len = datalen;
+ return 0;
+}
Code Review / kvmfornfv.git / blobdiff