Add the rt linux 4.1.3-rt3 as base
[kvmfornfv.git] / kernel / net / core / scm.c
diff --git a/kernel/net/core/scm.c b/kernel/net/core/scm.c
new file mode 100644 (file)
index 0000000..3b6899b
--- /dev/null
@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+/* scm.c - Socket level control messages processing.
+ *
+ * Author:     Alexey Kuznetsov, <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru>
+ *              Alignment and value checking mods by Craig Metz
+ *
+ *             This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ *             modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License
+ *             as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version
+ *             2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/signal.h>
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/errno.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/interrupt.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/pid.h>
+#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+
+#include <net/protocol.h>
+#include <linux/skbuff.h>
+#include <net/sock.h>
+#include <net/compat.h>
+#include <net/scm.h>
+#include <net/cls_cgroup.h>
+
+
+/*
+ *     Only allow a user to send credentials, that they could set with
+ *     setu(g)id.
+ */
+
+static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds)
+{
+       const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
+       kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid);
+       kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid);
+
+       if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) ||
+            ns_capable(task_active_pid_ns(current)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) &&
+           ((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid)   || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) ||
+             uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) &&
+           ((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid)   || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) ||
+             gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))) {
+              return 0;
+       }
+       return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp)
+{
+       int *fdp = (int*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg);
+       struct scm_fp_list *fpl = *fplp;
+       struct file **fpp;
+       int i, num;
+
+       num = (cmsg->cmsg_len - CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))/sizeof(int);
+
+       if (num <= 0)
+               return 0;
+
+       if (num > SCM_MAX_FD)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       if (!fpl)
+       {
+               fpl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scm_fp_list), GFP_KERNEL);
+               if (!fpl)
+                       return -ENOMEM;
+               *fplp = fpl;
+               fpl->count = 0;
+               fpl->max = SCM_MAX_FD;
+       }
+       fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count];
+
+       if (fpl->count + num > fpl->max)
+               return -EINVAL;
+
+       /*
+        *      Verify the descriptors and increment the usage count.
+        */
+
+       for (i=0; i< num; i++)
+       {
+               int fd = fdp[i];
+               struct file *file;
+
+               if (fd < 0 || !(file = fget_raw(fd)))
+                       return -EBADF;
+               *fpp++ = file;
+               fpl->count++;
+       }
+       return num;
+}
+
+void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+       struct scm_fp_list *fpl = scm->fp;
+       int i;
+
+       if (fpl) {
+               scm->fp = NULL;
+               for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--)
+                       fput(fpl->fp[i]);
+               kfree(fpl);
+       }
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__scm_destroy);
+
+int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p)
+{
+       struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
+       int err;
+
+       for_each_cmsghdr(cmsg, msg) {
+               err = -EINVAL;
+
+               /* Verify that cmsg_len is at least sizeof(struct cmsghdr) */
+               /* The first check was omitted in <= 2.2.5. The reasoning was
+                  that parser checks cmsg_len in any case, so that
+                  additional check would be work duplication.
+                  But if cmsg_level is not SOL_SOCKET, we do not check
+                  for too short ancillary data object at all! Oops.
+                  OK, let's add it...
+                */
+               if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg))
+                       goto error;
+
+               if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET)
+                       continue;
+
+               switch (cmsg->cmsg_type)
+               {
+               case SCM_RIGHTS:
+                       if (!sock->ops || sock->ops->family != PF_UNIX)
+                               goto error;
+                       err=scm_fp_copy(cmsg, &p->fp);
+                       if (err<0)
+                               goto error;
+                       break;
+               case SCM_CREDENTIALS:
+               {
+                       struct ucred creds;
+                       kuid_t uid;
+                       kgid_t gid;
+                       if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred)))
+                               goto error;
+                       memcpy(&creds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(struct ucred));
+                       err = scm_check_creds(&creds);
+                       if (err)
+                               goto error;
+
+                       p->creds.pid = creds.pid;
+                       if (!p->pid || pid_vnr(p->pid) != creds.pid) {
+                               struct pid *pid;
+                               err = -ESRCH;
+                               pid = find_get_pid(creds.pid);
+                               if (!pid)
+                                       goto error;
+                               put_pid(p->pid);
+                               p->pid = pid;
+                       }
+
+                       err = -EINVAL;
+                       uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), creds.uid);
+                       gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), creds.gid);
+                       if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid))
+                               goto error;
+
+                       p->creds.uid = uid;
+                       p->creds.gid = gid;
+                       break;
+               }
+               default:
+                       goto error;
+               }
+       }
+
+       if (p->fp && !p->fp->count)
+       {
+               kfree(p->fp);
+               p->fp = NULL;
+       }
+       return 0;
+
+error:
+       scm_destroy(p);
+       return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(__scm_send);
+
+int put_cmsg(struct msghdr * msg, int level, int type, int len, void *data)
+{
+       struct cmsghdr __user *cm
+               = (__force struct cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control;
+       struct cmsghdr cmhdr;
+       int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(len);
+       int err;
+
+       if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & msg->msg_flags)
+               return put_cmsg_compat(msg, level, type, len, data);
+
+       if (cm==NULL || msg->msg_controllen < sizeof(*cm)) {
+               msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+               return 0; /* XXX: return error? check spec. */
+       }
+       if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen) {
+               msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+               cmlen = msg->msg_controllen;
+       }
+       cmhdr.cmsg_level = level;
+       cmhdr.cmsg_type = type;
+       cmhdr.cmsg_len = cmlen;
+
+       err = -EFAULT;
+       if (copy_to_user(cm, &cmhdr, sizeof cmhdr))
+               goto out;
+       if (copy_to_user(CMSG_DATA(cm), data, cmlen - sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))
+               goto out;
+       cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(len);
+       if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen)
+               cmlen = msg->msg_controllen;
+       msg->msg_control += cmlen;
+       msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
+       err = 0;
+out:
+       return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_cmsg);
+
+void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm)
+{
+       struct cmsghdr __user *cm
+               = (__force struct cmsghdr __user*)msg->msg_control;
+
+       int fdmax = 0;
+       int fdnum = scm->fp->count;
+       struct file **fp = scm->fp->fp;
+       int __user *cmfptr;
+       int err = 0, i;
+
+       if (MSG_CMSG_COMPAT & msg->msg_flags) {
+               scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm);
+               return;
+       }
+
+       if (msg->msg_controllen > sizeof(struct cmsghdr))
+               fdmax = ((msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct cmsghdr))
+                        / sizeof(int));
+
+       if (fdnum < fdmax)
+               fdmax = fdnum;
+
+       for (i=0, cmfptr=(__force int __user *)CMSG_DATA(cm); i<fdmax;
+            i++, cmfptr++)
+       {
+               struct socket *sock;
+               int new_fd;
+               err = security_file_receive(fp[i]);
+               if (err)
+                       break;
+               err = get_unused_fd_flags(MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC & msg->msg_flags
+                                         ? O_CLOEXEC : 0);
+               if (err < 0)
+                       break;
+               new_fd = err;
+               err = put_user(new_fd, cmfptr);
+               if (err) {
+                       put_unused_fd(new_fd);
+                       break;
+               }
+               /* Bump the usage count and install the file. */
+               sock = sock_from_file(fp[i], &err);
+               if (sock) {
+                       sock_update_netprioidx(sock->sk);
+                       sock_update_classid(sock->sk);
+               }
+               fd_install(new_fd, get_file(fp[i]));
+       }
+
+       if (i > 0)
+       {
+               int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i*sizeof(int));
+               err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level);
+               if (!err)
+                       err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type);
+               if (!err)
+                       err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len);
+               if (!err) {
+                       cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i*sizeof(int));
+                       msg->msg_control += cmlen;
+                       msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen;
+               }
+       }
+       if (i < fdnum || (fdnum && fdmax <= 0))
+               msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC;
+
+       /*
+        * All of the files that fit in the message have had their
+        * usage counts incremented, so we just free the list.
+        */
+       __scm_destroy(scm);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_detach_fds);
+
+struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl)
+{
+       struct scm_fp_list *new_fpl;
+       int i;
+
+       if (!fpl)
+               return NULL;
+
+       new_fpl = kmemdup(fpl, offsetof(struct scm_fp_list, fp[fpl->count]),
+                         GFP_KERNEL);
+       if (new_fpl) {
+               for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++)
+                       get_file(fpl->fp[i]);
+               new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count;
+       }
+       return new_fpl;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_fp_dup);