2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007, 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
28 #include <linux/kernel.h>
29 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
30 #include <linux/errno.h>
31 #include <linux/sched.h>
32 #include <linux/security.h>
33 #include <linux/xattr.h>
34 #include <linux/capability.h>
35 #include <linux/unistd.h>
37 #include <linux/mman.h>
38 #include <linux/slab.h>
39 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
40 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
41 #include <linux/swap.h>
42 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
43 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
44 #include <linux/dcache.h>
45 #include <linux/file.h>
46 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
47 #include <linux/namei.h>
48 #include <linux/mount.h>
49 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
50 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
51 #include <linux/tty.h>
53 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
54 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
55 #include <net/inet_connection_sock.h>
56 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
57 #include <net/netlabel.h>
58 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
59 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
60 #include <linux/atomic.h>
61 #include <linux/bitops.h>
62 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
63 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
64 #include <net/netlink.h>
65 #include <linux/tcp.h>
66 #include <linux/udp.h>
67 #include <linux/dccp.h>
68 #include <linux/quota.h>
69 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
70 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
71 #include <linux/parser.h>
72 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
74 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
75 #include <linux/personality.h>
76 #include <linux/audit.h>
77 #include <linux/string.h>
78 #include <linux/selinux.h>
79 #include <linux/mutex.h>
80 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
81 #include <linux/syslog.h>
82 #include <linux/user_namespace.h>
83 #include <linux/export.h>
84 #include <linux/msg.h>
85 #include <linux/shm.h>
97 /* SECMARK reference count */
98 static atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
100 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
101 int selinux_enforcing;
103 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
105 unsigned long enforcing;
106 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
107 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
110 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
113 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
114 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
116 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
118 unsigned long enabled;
119 if (!kstrtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
120 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
123 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
125 int selinux_enabled = 1;
128 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
131 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
134 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
135 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
136 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
137 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled. If the always_check_network
138 * policy capability is enabled, SECMARK is always considered enabled.
141 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
143 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount));
147 * selinux_peerlbl_enabled - Check to see if peer labeling is currently enabled
150 * This function checks if NetLabel or labeled IPSEC is enabled. Returns true
151 * (1) if any are enabled or false (0) if neither are enabled. If the
152 * always_check_network policy capability is enabled, peer labeling
153 * is always considered enabled.
156 static int selinux_peerlbl_enabled(void)
158 return (selinux_policycap_alwaysnetwork || netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled());
161 static int selinux_netcache_avc_callback(u32 event)
163 if (event == AVC_CALLBACK_RESET) {
173 * initialise the security for the init task
175 static void cred_init_security(void)
177 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
178 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
180 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
182 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
184 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
185 cred->security = tsec;
189 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
191 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
193 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
195 tsec = cred->security;
200 * get the objective security ID of a task
202 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
207 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
213 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
215 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
217 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
222 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
224 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
226 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
227 u32 sid = current_sid();
229 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
233 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
234 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
236 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
237 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
238 isec->task_sid = sid;
239 inode->i_security = isec;
244 static void inode_free_rcu(struct rcu_head *head)
246 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
248 isec = container_of(head, struct inode_security_struct, rcu);
249 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
252 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
254 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
255 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
257 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
258 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
259 list_del_init(&isec->list);
260 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
263 * The inode may still be referenced in a path walk and
264 * a call to selinux_inode_permission() can be made
265 * after inode_free_security() is called. Ideally, the VFS
266 * wouldn't do this, but fixing that is a much harder
267 * job. For now, simply free the i_security via RCU, and
268 * leave the current inode->i_security pointer intact.
269 * The inode will be freed after the RCU grace period too.
271 call_rcu(&isec->rcu, inode_free_rcu);
274 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
276 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
277 u32 sid = current_sid();
279 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
284 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
285 file->f_security = fsec;
290 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
292 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
293 file->f_security = NULL;
297 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
299 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
301 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
305 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
306 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
307 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
309 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
310 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
311 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sb->s_security = sbsec;
317 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
319 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
320 sb->s_security = NULL;
324 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
326 static const char *labeling_behaviors[7] = {
328 "uses transition SIDs",
330 "uses genfs_contexts",
331 "not configured for labeling",
332 "uses mountpoint labeling",
333 "uses native labeling",
336 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
338 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
340 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
349 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
353 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS (Opt_nextmntopt - 1)
355 static const match_table_t tokens = {
356 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
357 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
358 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
359 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
360 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
364 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
366 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
367 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
368 const struct cred *cred)
370 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
373 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
374 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
378 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
379 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
383 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
384 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
385 const struct cred *cred)
387 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
389 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
390 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
394 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
395 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
399 static int selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(struct super_block *sb)
401 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
403 return sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR ||
404 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS ||
405 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK ||
406 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE ||
407 /* Special handling. Genfs but also in-core setxattr handler */
408 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
409 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
410 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "debugfs") ||
411 !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "rootfs");
414 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
416 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
417 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
418 struct inode *root_inode = d_backing_inode(root);
421 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
422 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
423 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
424 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
425 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
426 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
427 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
428 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
429 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
433 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
434 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
435 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
436 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
437 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
438 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
440 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
441 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
442 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
447 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
448 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
449 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
451 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBINITIALIZED;
452 if (selinux_is_sblabel_mnt(sb))
453 sbsec->flags |= SBLABEL_MNT;
455 /* Initialize the root inode. */
456 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
458 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
459 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
460 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
462 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
464 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
465 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
466 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
467 struct inode_security_struct, list);
468 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
469 list_del_init(&isec->list);
470 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
471 inode = igrab(inode);
473 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
477 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
480 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
486 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
487 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
488 * mount options, or whatever.
490 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
491 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
494 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
495 char *context = NULL;
499 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
501 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
507 /* make sure we always check enough bits to cover the mask */
508 BUILD_BUG_ON(SE_MNTMASK >= (1 << NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS));
510 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
511 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
512 for (i = 0; i < NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS; i++) {
514 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
517 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
518 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)
519 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
521 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
527 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
528 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
534 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
535 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
538 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
539 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
541 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
542 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
545 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
546 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
548 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
549 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
552 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
553 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
555 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
556 struct inode *root = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
557 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
559 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
562 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
563 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
565 if (sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT) {
566 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
567 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SBLABEL_MNT;
570 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
575 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
579 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
580 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
582 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
584 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
585 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
586 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
587 (old_sid != new_sid))
590 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
591 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
593 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
594 if (mnt_flags & flag)
600 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
601 * labeling information.
603 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
604 struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
605 unsigned long kern_flags,
606 unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
608 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
610 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
611 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
612 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(sbsec->sb->s_root);
613 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
614 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
615 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
616 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
617 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
618 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
620 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
622 if (!ss_initialized) {
624 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
625 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
626 server is ready to handle calls. */
630 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
631 "before the security server is initialized\n");
634 if (kern_flags && !set_kern_flags) {
635 /* Specifying internal flags without providing a place to
636 * place the results is not allowed */
642 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
643 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
644 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
645 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
647 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
648 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
649 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
650 * will be used for both mounts)
652 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
657 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
658 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
659 * than once with different security options.
661 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
664 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
666 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
667 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
669 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
670 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
671 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
678 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
680 goto out_double_mount;
682 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
687 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
689 goto out_double_mount;
691 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
693 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
694 rootcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
704 defcontext_sid = sid;
706 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
708 goto out_double_mount;
710 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
719 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
720 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
721 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
722 goto out_double_mount;
727 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
728 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
730 if (!sbsec->behavior) {
732 * Determine the labeling behavior to use for this
735 rc = security_fs_use(sb);
738 "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
739 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
743 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
745 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
749 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
753 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
754 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
755 * the superblock context if not already set.
757 if (kern_flags & SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS && !context_sid) {
758 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE;
759 *set_kern_flags |= SECURITY_LSM_NATIVE_LABELS;
763 if (!fscontext_sid) {
764 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
768 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
770 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
775 if (!rootcontext_sid)
776 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
778 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
779 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
782 if (rootcontext_sid) {
783 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
788 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
789 root_isec->initialized = 1;
792 if (defcontext_sid) {
793 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR &&
794 sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE) {
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
797 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
801 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
802 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
808 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
811 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
813 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
817 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
818 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
822 static int selinux_cmp_sb_context(const struct super_block *oldsb,
823 const struct super_block *newsb)
825 struct superblock_security_struct *old = oldsb->s_security;
826 struct superblock_security_struct *new = newsb->s_security;
827 char oldflags = old->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
828 char newflags = new->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
830 if (oldflags != newflags)
832 if ((oldflags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) && old->sid != new->sid)
834 if ((oldflags & CONTEXT_MNT) && old->mntpoint_sid != new->mntpoint_sid)
836 if ((oldflags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) && old->def_sid != new->def_sid)
838 if (oldflags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
839 struct inode_security_struct *oldroot = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root)->i_security;
840 struct inode_security_struct *newroot = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root)->i_security;
841 if (oldroot->sid != newroot->sid)
846 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, "
847 "different security settings for (dev %s, "
848 "type %s)\n", newsb->s_id, newsb->s_type->name);
852 static int selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
853 struct super_block *newsb)
855 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
856 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
858 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
859 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
860 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
863 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
864 * mount options. thus we can safely deal with this superblock later
869 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
870 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
872 /* if fs is reusing a sb, make sure that the contexts match */
873 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
874 return selinux_cmp_sb_context(oldsb, newsb);
876 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
878 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
880 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
881 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
882 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
885 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
889 if (!set_rootcontext) {
890 struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
891 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
894 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
896 if (set_rootcontext) {
897 const struct inode *oldinode = d_backing_inode(oldsb->s_root);
898 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
899 struct inode *newinode = d_backing_inode(newsb->s_root);
900 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
902 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
905 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
906 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
910 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
911 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
914 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
915 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
916 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
918 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
920 /* Standard string-based options. */
921 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
923 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
928 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
932 if (context || defcontext) {
934 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
937 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
947 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
950 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
957 case Opt_rootcontext:
960 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
963 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
971 if (context || defcontext) {
973 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
976 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
982 case Opt_labelsupport:
986 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
993 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
997 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
998 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
999 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
1004 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
1005 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
1008 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
1009 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
1012 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
1013 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
1016 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
1017 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
1020 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
1031 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
1033 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
1036 char *options = data;
1037 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1039 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
1044 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1046 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1051 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
1054 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1058 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1059 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1064 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1067 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1068 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1072 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1074 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1077 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1079 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1080 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1082 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1083 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1087 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1093 /* we need a comma before each option */
1095 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1098 seq_escape(m, opts->mnt_opts[i], "\"\n\\");
1104 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1106 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1109 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1111 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1117 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1119 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1124 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1126 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1128 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1130 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1132 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1134 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1136 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1138 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1140 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1144 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1147 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1149 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1152 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1154 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1157 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1163 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1164 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1166 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1173 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1174 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1176 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1178 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1179 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1181 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1183 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1185 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1191 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1192 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1193 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1194 case NETLINK_SOCK_DIAG:
1195 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1197 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1199 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1200 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1201 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1203 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1204 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1205 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1206 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1207 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1208 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1209 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1211 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1214 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1216 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1218 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1221 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1224 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1225 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1230 char *buffer, *path;
1232 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1236 path = dentry_path_raw(dentry, buffer, PAGE_SIZE);
1240 /* each process gets a /proc/PID/ entry. Strip off the
1241 * PID part to get a valid selinux labeling.
1242 * e.g. /proc/1/net/rpc/nfs -> /net/rpc/nfs */
1243 while (path[1] >= '0' && path[1] <= '9') {
1247 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1249 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1253 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct dentry *dentry,
1261 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1262 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1264 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1265 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1267 struct dentry *dentry;
1268 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1269 char *context = NULL;
1273 if (isec->initialized)
1276 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1277 if (isec->initialized)
1280 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1281 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1282 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1283 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1284 server is ready to handle calls. */
1285 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1286 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1287 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1288 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1292 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1293 case SECURITY_FS_USE_NATIVE:
1295 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1296 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1297 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1301 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1302 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1304 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1305 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1307 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1308 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1312 * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1313 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1314 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1315 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
1316 * will get fixed up the next time we go through
1317 * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
1318 * be used again by userspace.
1323 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1324 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1330 context[len] = '\0';
1331 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1333 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1336 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1337 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1344 context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
1350 context[len] = '\0';
1351 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1357 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1358 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1359 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1360 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1364 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1365 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1368 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1372 char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
1373 unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
1375 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
1376 if (printk_ratelimit())
1377 printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
1378 "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
1379 "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
1381 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1382 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1383 __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
1386 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1394 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1395 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1397 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1398 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1399 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1401 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1402 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1403 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid, sbsec->sid,
1404 isec->sclass, NULL, &sid);
1409 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1410 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1413 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1414 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1416 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1417 /* We must have a dentry to determine the label on
1420 /* Called from d_instantiate or
1421 * d_splice_alias. */
1422 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1424 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to
1426 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1428 * This can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
1429 * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
1430 * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
1431 * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as
1432 * these will get fixed up the next time we go through
1433 * inode_doinit() with a dentry, before these inodes
1434 * could be used again by userspace.
1438 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1439 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(dentry, isec->sclass, &sid);
1448 isec->initialized = 1;
1451 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1453 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1454 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1458 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1459 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1465 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1466 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1469 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1470 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1473 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1474 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1477 /* All other signals. */
1478 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1486 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1487 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1489 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1490 const struct cred *target,
1493 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1495 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1499 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1500 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1501 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1502 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1504 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1505 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1508 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1512 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1513 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1515 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1519 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1520 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1521 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1522 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1524 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1529 sid = current_sid();
1530 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1531 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1534 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1535 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1538 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1539 static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,
1542 struct common_audit_data ad;
1543 struct av_decision avd;
1545 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1546 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1549 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_CAP;
1552 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1554 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1557 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1561 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1566 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1567 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) {
1568 int rc2 = avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1575 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1576 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1579 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1581 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1582 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1585 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1586 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1587 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1588 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1589 struct inode *inode,
1591 struct common_audit_data *adp)
1593 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1596 validate_creds(cred);
1598 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1601 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1602 isec = inode->i_security;
1604 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1607 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1608 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1609 pathname if needed. */
1610 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1611 struct dentry *dentry,
1614 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
1615 struct common_audit_data ad;
1617 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1618 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1619 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1622 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1623 the path to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1624 pathname if needed. */
1625 static inline int path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1626 const struct path *path,
1629 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
1630 struct common_audit_data ad;
1632 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1634 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1637 /* Same as path_has_perm, but uses the inode from the file struct. */
1638 static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1642 struct common_audit_data ad;
1644 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1645 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1646 return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad);
1649 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1650 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1651 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1652 check a particular permission to the file.
1653 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1654 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1655 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1656 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1657 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1661 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1662 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
1663 struct common_audit_data ad;
1664 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1667 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1668 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1670 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1671 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1679 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1682 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1688 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1689 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1690 struct dentry *dentry,
1693 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
1694 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1695 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1697 struct common_audit_data ad;
1700 dsec = dir->i_security;
1701 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1704 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1706 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1707 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1709 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1710 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1715 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
1716 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1717 &dentry->d_name, &newsid);
1722 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1726 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1727 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1728 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1731 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1732 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1733 struct task_struct *ctx)
1735 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1737 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1741 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1744 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1745 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1746 struct dentry *dentry,
1750 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1751 struct common_audit_data ad;
1752 u32 sid = current_sid();
1756 dsec = dir->i_security;
1757 isec = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
1759 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1760 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
1763 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1764 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1779 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1784 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1788 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1789 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1790 struct inode *new_dir,
1791 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1793 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1794 struct common_audit_data ad;
1795 u32 sid = current_sid();
1797 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1800 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1801 old_isec = d_backing_inode(old_dentry)->i_security;
1802 old_is_dir = d_is_dir(old_dentry);
1803 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1805 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
1807 ad.u.dentry = old_dentry;
1808 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1809 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1812 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1813 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1816 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1817 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1818 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1823 ad.u.dentry = new_dentry;
1824 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1825 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry))
1826 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1827 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1830 if (d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
1831 new_isec = d_backing_inode(new_dentry)->i_security;
1832 new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new_dentry);
1833 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1835 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1843 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1844 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1845 struct super_block *sb,
1847 struct common_audit_data *ad)
1849 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1850 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1852 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1853 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1856 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1857 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1861 if (!S_ISDIR(mode)) {
1862 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1863 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1864 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1867 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1869 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1873 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1875 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1877 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1884 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1885 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1889 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1891 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1892 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1899 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1908 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1911 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1913 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1915 if (selinux_policycap_openperm)
1921 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1923 static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
1925 u32 mysid = current_sid();
1926 u32 mgrsid = task_sid(mgr);
1928 return avc_has_perm(mysid, mgrsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
1929 BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
1932 static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
1933 struct task_struct *to)
1935 u32 mysid = current_sid();
1936 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
1937 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
1940 if (mysid != fromsid) {
1941 rc = avc_has_perm(mysid, fromsid, SECCLASS_BINDER,
1942 BINDER__IMPERSONATE, NULL);
1947 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL,
1951 static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
1952 struct task_struct *to)
1954 u32 fromsid = task_sid(from);
1955 u32 tosid = task_sid(to);
1957 return avc_has_perm(fromsid, tosid, SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
1961 static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
1962 struct task_struct *to,
1965 u32 sid = task_sid(to);
1966 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1967 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(file->f_path.dentry);
1968 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1969 struct common_audit_data ad;
1972 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
1973 ad.u.path = file->f_path;
1975 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1976 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1984 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1987 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, file_to_av(file),
1991 static int selinux_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
1996 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
2000 if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
2001 u32 sid = current_sid();
2002 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
2003 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
2006 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2009 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
2013 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
2017 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
2020 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
2021 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2025 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
2029 return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
2032 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
2033 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
2034 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
2035 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
2039 error = cap_capset(new, old,
2040 effective, inheritable, permitted);
2044 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
2048 * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
2049 * which was removed).
2051 * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
2052 * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
2053 * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
2054 * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
2057 static int selinux_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
2062 rc = cap_capable(cred, ns, cap, audit);
2066 return cred_has_capability(cred, cap, audit);
2069 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
2071 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2083 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2088 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2091 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2097 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2099 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2101 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2104 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2109 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_ALL: /* Read last kernel messages */
2110 case SYSLOG_ACTION_SIZE_BUFFER: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2111 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2113 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_OFF: /* Disable logging to console */
2114 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_ON: /* Enable logging to console */
2115 /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2116 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CONSOLE_LEVEL:
2117 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2119 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLOSE: /* Close log */
2120 case SYSLOG_ACTION_OPEN: /* Open log */
2121 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ: /* Read from log */
2122 case SYSLOG_ACTION_READ_CLEAR: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2123 case SYSLOG_ACTION_CLEAR: /* Clear ring buffer */
2125 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2132 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2133 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2134 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2136 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2137 * processes that allocate mappings.
2139 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2141 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2143 rc = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2144 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2148 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2151 /* binprm security operations */
2153 static int check_nnp_nosuid(const struct linux_binprm *bprm,
2154 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec,
2155 const struct task_security_struct *new_tsec)
2157 int nnp = (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_NO_NEW_PRIVS);
2158 int nosuid = (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID);
2161 if (!nnp && !nosuid)
2162 return 0; /* neither NNP nor nosuid */
2164 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid)
2165 return 0; /* No change in credentials */
2168 * The only transitions we permit under NNP or nosuid
2169 * are transitions to bounded SIDs, i.e. SIDs that are
2170 * guaranteed to only be allowed a subset of the permissions
2171 * of the current SID.
2173 rc = security_bounded_transition(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid);
2176 * On failure, preserve the errno values for NNP vs nosuid.
2177 * NNP: Operation not permitted for caller.
2178 * nosuid: Permission denied to file.
2188 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2190 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2191 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2192 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2193 struct common_audit_data ad;
2194 struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
2197 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2201 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2202 * the script interpreter */
2203 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2206 old_tsec = current_security();
2207 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2208 isec = inode->i_security;
2210 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2211 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2212 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2214 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2215 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2216 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2217 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2219 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2220 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2221 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2222 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2224 /* Fail on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed transition. */
2225 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2229 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2230 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2231 SECCLASS_PROCESS, NULL,
2237 * Fallback to old SID on NNP or nosuid if not an allowed
2240 rc = check_nnp_nosuid(bprm, old_tsec, new_tsec);
2242 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2245 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH;
2246 ad.u.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2248 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2249 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2250 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2254 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2255 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2256 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2260 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2261 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2265 /* Check for shared state */
2266 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2267 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2268 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2274 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2275 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2277 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2278 struct task_struct *tracer;
2279 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2283 tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
2284 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2285 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2291 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2293 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2299 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2300 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2306 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2308 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2316 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2317 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2318 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2319 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2321 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2324 return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2327 static int match_file(const void *p, struct file *file, unsigned fd)
2329 return file_has_perm(p, file, file_to_av(file)) ? fd + 1 : 0;
2332 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2333 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2334 struct files_struct *files)
2336 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2337 struct tty_struct *tty;
2341 tty = get_current_tty();
2343 spin_lock(&tty_files_lock);
2344 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2345 struct tty_file_private *file_priv;
2347 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2348 Use file_path_has_perm on the tty path directly
2349 rather than using file_has_perm, as this particular
2350 open file may belong to another process and we are
2351 only interested in the inode-based check here. */
2352 file_priv = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files,
2353 struct tty_file_private, list);
2354 file = file_priv->file;
2355 if (file_path_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE))
2358 spin_unlock(&tty_files_lock);
2361 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2365 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2366 n = iterate_fd(files, 0, match_file, cred);
2367 if (!n) /* none found? */
2370 devnull = dentry_open(&selinux_null, O_RDWR, cred);
2371 if (IS_ERR(devnull))
2373 /* replace all the matching ones with this */
2375 replace_fd(n - 1, devnull, 0);
2376 } while ((n = iterate_fd(files, n, match_file, cred)) != 0);
2382 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2384 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2386 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2387 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2390 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2391 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2394 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2395 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2397 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2398 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2400 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2401 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2402 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2404 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2405 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2406 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2407 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2408 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2410 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2411 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2413 /* protect against do_prlimit() */
2415 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2416 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2417 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2418 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2420 task_unlock(current);
2421 update_rlimit_cpu(current, rlimit(RLIMIT_CPU));
2426 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2429 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2431 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2432 struct itimerval itimer;
2442 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2443 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2444 * flush and unblock signals.
2446 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2447 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2449 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2451 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2452 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2453 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2454 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2455 if (!(current->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
2456 __flush_signals(current);
2457 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2458 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2460 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2463 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2464 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2465 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
2466 __wake_up_parent(current, current->real_parent);
2467 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
2470 /* superblock security operations */
2472 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2474 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2477 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2479 superblock_free_security(sb);
2482 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2487 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2490 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2492 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2493 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2494 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2495 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2496 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2499 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2506 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2510 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2513 int current_size = 0;
2521 while (current_size < len) {
2531 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2533 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2534 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2535 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2541 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2549 in_save = in_end = orig;
2553 open_quote = !open_quote;
2554 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2556 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2558 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2559 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2561 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2563 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2565 } while (*in_end++);
2567 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2568 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2573 static int selinux_sb_remount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2576 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
2577 char *secdata, **mount_options;
2578 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
2580 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
2586 if (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
2589 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
2590 secdata = alloc_secdata();
2593 rc = selinux_sb_copy_data(data, secdata);
2595 goto out_free_secdata;
2597 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(secdata, &opts);
2599 goto out_free_secdata;
2601 mount_options = opts.mnt_opts;
2602 flags = opts.mnt_opts_flags;
2604 for (i = 0; i < opts.num_mnt_opts; i++) {
2608 if (flags[i] == SBLABEL_MNT)
2610 len = strlen(mount_options[i]);
2611 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i], len, &sid,
2614 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
2615 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
2616 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name, rc);
2622 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid, sid))
2623 goto out_bad_option;
2626 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid, sid))
2627 goto out_bad_option;
2629 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT: {
2630 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec;
2631 root_isec = d_backing_inode(sb->s_root)->i_security;
2633 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid, sid))
2634 goto out_bad_option;
2637 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
2638 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid, sid))
2639 goto out_bad_option;
2648 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
2650 free_secdata(secdata);
2653 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unable to change security options "
2654 "during remount (dev %s, type=%s)\n", sb->s_id,
2659 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2661 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2662 struct common_audit_data ad;
2665 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2669 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2670 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2673 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2674 ad.u.dentry = sb->s_root;
2675 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2678 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2680 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2681 struct common_audit_data ad;
2683 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
2684 ad.u.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2685 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2688 static int selinux_mount(const char *dev_name,
2691 unsigned long flags,
2694 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2696 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2697 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->dentry->d_sb,
2698 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2700 return path_has_perm(cred, path, FILE__MOUNTON);
2703 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2705 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2707 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2708 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2711 /* inode security operations */
2713 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2715 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2718 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2720 inode_free_security(inode);
2723 static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
2724 struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
2727 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2728 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2729 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2730 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2731 struct inode *dir = d_backing_inode(dentry->d_parent);
2735 tsec = cred->security;
2736 dsec = dir->i_security;
2737 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2739 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2740 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2742 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2743 inode_mode_to_security_class(mode),
2748 "%s: security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d\n",
2754 return security_sid_to_context(newsid, (char **)ctx, ctxlen);
2757 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2758 const struct qstr *qstr,
2760 void **value, size_t *len)
2762 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2763 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2764 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2765 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2769 dsec = dir->i_security;
2770 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2773 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2775 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) &&
2776 (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT))
2777 newsid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
2778 else if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT)) {
2779 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2780 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2783 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2784 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2787 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2792 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2793 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2794 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2795 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2797 isec->initialized = 1;
2800 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
2804 *name = XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX;
2807 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2817 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode)
2819 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2822 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2824 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2827 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2829 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2832 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2834 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2837 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mask)
2839 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2842 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2844 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2847 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode, dev_t dev)
2849 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2852 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2853 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2855 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2858 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2860 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2862 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2865 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2867 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2869 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
2872 static noinline int audit_inode_permission(struct inode *inode,
2873 u32 perms, u32 audited, u32 denied,
2877 struct common_audit_data ad;
2878 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2881 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE;
2884 rc = slow_avc_audit(current_sid(), isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms,
2885 audited, denied, result, &ad, flags);
2891 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2893 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2896 unsigned flags = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
2897 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2899 struct av_decision avd;
2901 u32 audited, denied;
2903 from_access = mask & MAY_ACCESS;
2904 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
2906 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2910 validate_creds(cred);
2912 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
2915 perms = file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask);
2917 sid = cred_sid(cred);
2918 isec = inode->i_security;
2920 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, 0, &avd);
2921 audited = avc_audit_required(perms, &avd, rc,
2922 from_access ? FILE__AUDIT_ACCESS : 0,
2924 if (likely(!audited))
2927 rc2 = audit_inode_permission(inode, perms, audited, denied, rc, flags);
2933 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2935 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2936 unsigned int ia_valid = iattr->ia_valid;
2937 __u32 av = FILE__WRITE;
2939 /* ATTR_FORCE is just used for ATTR_KILL_S[UG]ID. */
2940 if (ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE) {
2941 ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_KILL_SUID | ATTR_KILL_SGID | ATTR_MODE |
2947 if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2948 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET | ATTR_TIMES_SET))
2949 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2951 if (selinux_policycap_openperm && (ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE))
2954 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, av);
2957 static int selinux_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
2959 return path_has_perm(current_cred(), path, FILE__GETATTR);
2962 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2964 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2966 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2967 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2968 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2969 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2971 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2972 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2973 Restrict to administrator. */
2978 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2979 ordinary setattr permission. */
2980 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2983 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2984 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2986 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
2987 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2988 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2989 struct common_audit_data ad;
2990 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2993 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2994 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2996 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2997 if (!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
3000 if (!inode_owner_or_capable(inode))
3003 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY;
3004 ad.u.dentry = dentry;
3006 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
3007 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
3011 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3012 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
3013 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
3014 struct audit_buffer *ab;
3018 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
3019 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
3022 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
3023 audit_size = size - 1;
3030 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
3031 audit_log_format(ab, "op=setxattr invalid_context=");
3032 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
3037 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3042 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
3043 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
3047 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
3052 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
3054 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
3055 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
3059 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
3060 const void *value, size_t size,
3063 struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
3064 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3068 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
3069 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
3073 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
3075 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
3076 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
3077 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
3081 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3083 isec->initialized = 1;
3088 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3090 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3092 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3095 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
3097 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3099 return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
3102 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
3104 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
3105 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
3107 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
3108 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
3113 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
3115 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
3117 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
3121 char *context = NULL;
3122 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3124 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3128 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
3129 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
3130 * use the in-core value under current policy.
3131 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
3132 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
3133 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
3134 * in-core context value, not a denial.
3136 error = selinux_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
3137 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
3139 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
3142 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
3155 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
3156 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
3158 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3162 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
3165 if (!value || !size)
3168 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid, GFP_KERNEL);
3172 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
3174 isec->initialized = 1;
3178 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
3180 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
3181 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
3182 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
3186 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
3188 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3192 /* file security operations */
3194 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3196 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3197 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3199 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
3200 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
3203 return file_has_perm(cred, file,
3204 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
3207 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
3209 struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
3210 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3211 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3212 u32 sid = current_sid();
3215 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3218 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid &&
3219 fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3220 /* No change since file_open check. */
3223 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3226 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3228 return file_alloc_security(file);
3231 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3233 file_free_security(file);
3236 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3239 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3249 case FS_IOC_GETFLAGS:
3251 case FS_IOC_GETVERSION:
3252 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__GETATTR);
3255 case FS_IOC_SETFLAGS:
3257 case FS_IOC_SETVERSION:
3258 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__SETATTR);
3261 /* sys_ioctl() checks */
3265 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3270 error = cred_has_capability(cred, CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
3271 SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT);
3274 /* default case assumes that the command will go
3275 * to the file's ioctl() function.
3278 error = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__IOCTL);
3283 static int default_noexec;
3285 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3287 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3290 if (default_noexec &&
3291 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || IS_PRIVATE(file_inode(file)) ||
3292 (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3294 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3295 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3296 * This has an additional check.
3298 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3304 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3305 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3307 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3308 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3311 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3312 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3314 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3321 static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
3325 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
3326 rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr);
3330 if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) {
3331 u32 sid = current_sid();
3332 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3333 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3339 static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3340 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags)
3342 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3345 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3346 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3349 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3350 unsigned long reqprot,
3353 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3355 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3358 if (default_noexec &&
3359 (prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3361 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3362 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3363 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3364 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3365 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3366 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3367 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3368 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3370 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3371 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3372 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3373 * modified content. This typically should only
3374 * occur for text relocations.
3376 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3382 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3385 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3387 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3389 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3392 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3395 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3400 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3401 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3410 case F_GETOWNER_UIDS:
3411 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3412 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3420 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3425 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3432 static void selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3434 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3436 fsec = file->f_security;
3437 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3440 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3441 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3444 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
3446 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3448 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3449 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3451 fsec = file->f_security;
3454 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3456 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3458 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3459 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3462 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3464 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3466 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3469 static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3471 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3472 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3474 fsec = file->f_security;
3475 isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
3477 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3478 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3479 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3480 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3481 * struct as its SID.
3483 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3484 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3486 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3487 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3488 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3489 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3490 * new inode label or new policy.
3491 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3493 return file_path_has_perm(cred, file, open_file_to_av(file));
3496 /* task security operations */
3498 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3500 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3504 * allocate the SELinux part of blank credentials
3506 static int selinux_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
3508 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3510 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3514 cred->security = tsec;
3519 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3521 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3523 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3526 * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
3527 * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
3529 BUG_ON(cred->security && (unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE);
3530 cred->security = (void *) 0x7UL;
3535 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3537 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3540 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3541 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3543 old_tsec = old->security;
3545 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3549 new->security = tsec;
3554 * transfer the SELinux data to a blank set of creds
3556 static void selinux_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3558 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec = old->security;
3559 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3565 * set the security data for a kernel service
3566 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3568 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3570 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3571 u32 sid = current_sid();
3574 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3575 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3576 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3580 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3581 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3582 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3588 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3589 * objective context of the specified inode
3591 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3593 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3594 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3595 u32 sid = current_sid();
3598 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3599 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3600 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3604 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3608 static int selinux_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
3611 struct common_audit_data ad;
3613 sid = task_sid(current);
3615 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KMOD;
3616 ad.u.kmod_name = kmod_name;
3618 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL, SECCLASS_SYSTEM,
3619 SYSTEM__MODULE_REQUEST, &ad);
3622 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3624 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3627 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3629 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3632 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3634 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3637 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3639 *secid = task_sid(p);
3642 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3646 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
3650 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3653 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3657 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3661 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3664 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3666 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3669 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *p, unsigned int resource,
3670 struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3672 struct rlimit *old_rlim = p->signal->rlim + resource;
3674 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3675 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3676 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3677 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3678 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3679 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3684 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3688 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
3692 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3695 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3697 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3700 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3702 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3705 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3712 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3714 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3716 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3717 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3719 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3723 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3725 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3728 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3729 struct inode *inode)
3731 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3732 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3735 isec->initialized = 1;
3738 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3739 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3740 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3742 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3743 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3745 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3746 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3750 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3751 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3754 ad->u.net->v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3755 ad->u.net->v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3759 *proto = ih->protocol;
3761 switch (ih->protocol) {
3763 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3765 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3769 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3773 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3774 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3779 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3781 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3785 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3789 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3790 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3794 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3795 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3797 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3801 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3805 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3806 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3817 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3819 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3820 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3821 struct common_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3824 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3825 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3828 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3829 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3833 ad->u.net->v6info.saddr = ip6->saddr;
3834 ad->u.net->v6info.daddr = ip6->daddr;
3837 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3838 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3839 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
3848 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3850 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3854 ad->u.net->sport = th->source;
3855 ad->u.net->dport = th->dest;
3860 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3862 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3866 ad->u.net->sport = uh->source;
3867 ad->u.net->dport = uh->dest;
3871 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3872 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3874 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3878 ad->u.net->sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3879 ad->u.net->dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3883 /* includes fragments */
3893 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct common_audit_data *ad,
3894 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3899 switch (ad->u.net->family) {
3901 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3904 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v4info.saddr :
3905 &ad->u.net->v4info.daddr);
3908 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3910 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3913 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net->v6info.saddr :
3914 &ad->u.net->v6info.daddr);
3924 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3925 " unable to parse packet\n");
3935 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3937 * @family: protocol family
3938 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3941 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3942 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3943 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3944 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3945 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3949 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3956 err = selinux_xfrm_skb_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3959 err = selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3963 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3964 if (unlikely(err)) {
3966 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3967 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3975 * selinux_conn_sid - Determine the child socket label for a connection
3976 * @sk_sid: the parent socket's SID
3977 * @skb_sid: the packet's SID
3978 * @conn_sid: the resulting connection SID
3980 * If @skb_sid is valid then the user:role:type information from @sk_sid is
3981 * combined with the MLS information from @skb_sid in order to create
3982 * @conn_sid. If @skb_sid is not valid then then @conn_sid is simply a copy
3983 * of @sk_sid. Returns zero on success, negative values on failure.
3986 static int selinux_conn_sid(u32 sk_sid, u32 skb_sid, u32 *conn_sid)
3990 if (skb_sid != SECSID_NULL)
3991 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sk_sid, skb_sid, conn_sid);
3998 /* socket security operations */
4000 static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec,
4001 u16 secclass, u32 *socksid)
4003 if (tsec->sockcreate_sid > SECSID_NULL) {
4004 *socksid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
4008 return security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, secclass, NULL,
4012 static int sock_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct sock *sk, u32 perms)
4014 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4015 struct common_audit_data ad;
4016 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4017 u32 tsid = task_sid(task);
4019 if (sksec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
4022 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4026 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sksec->sid, sksec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4029 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
4030 int protocol, int kern)
4032 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4040 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4041 rc = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, secclass, &newsid);
4045 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
4048 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
4049 int type, int protocol, int kern)
4051 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
4052 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4053 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4056 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
4059 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4061 err = socket_sockcreate_sid(tsec, isec->sclass, &(isec->sid));
4066 isec->initialized = 1;
4069 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4070 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
4071 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4072 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock->sk, family);
4078 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
4079 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
4080 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
4082 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4084 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4088 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__BIND);
4093 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
4094 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
4095 * check the first address now.
4097 family = sk->sk_family;
4098 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
4100 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4101 struct common_audit_data ad;
4102 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4103 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4104 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4105 unsigned short snum;
4108 if (family == PF_INET) {
4109 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4110 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4111 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4113 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4114 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4115 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
4121 inet_get_local_port_range(sock_net(sk), &low, &high);
4123 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
4124 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4128 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4130 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4131 ad.u.net->family = family;
4132 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4134 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
4140 switch (sksec->sclass) {
4141 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4142 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4145 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4146 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4149 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4150 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4154 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
4158 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
4162 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4164 ad.u.net->sport = htons(snum);
4165 ad.u.net->family = family;
4167 if (family == PF_INET)
4168 ad.u.net->v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
4170 ad.u.net->v6info.saddr = addr6->sin6_addr;
4172 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid,
4173 sksec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
4181 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
4183 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
4184 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4187 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, SOCKET__CONNECT);
4192 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
4194 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
4195 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
4196 struct common_audit_data ad;
4197 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4198 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
4199 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
4200 unsigned short snum;
4203 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
4204 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
4205 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
4207 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
4209 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
4210 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
4212 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
4215 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
4219 perm = (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
4220 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
4222 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4224 ad.u.net->dport = htons(snum);
4225 ad.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
4226 err = avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, sid, sksec->sclass, perm, &ad);
4231 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
4237 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
4239 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__LISTEN);
4242 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
4245 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4246 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
4248 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
4252 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4254 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4255 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4256 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4257 newisec->initialized = 1;
4262 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4265 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__WRITE);
4268 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4269 int size, int flags)
4271 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__READ);
4274 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4276 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4279 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4281 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4284 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4288 err = sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4292 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4295 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4298 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4301 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4303 return sock_has_perm(current, sock->sk, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4306 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
4310 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security;
4311 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security;
4312 struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security;
4313 struct common_audit_data ad;
4314 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4317 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4319 ad.u.net->sk = other;
4321 err = avc_has_perm(sksec_sock->sid, sksec_other->sid,
4322 sksec_other->sclass,
4323 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4327 /* server child socket */
4328 sksec_new->peer_sid = sksec_sock->sid;
4329 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec_other->sid, sksec_sock->sid,
4334 /* connecting socket */
4335 sksec_sock->peer_sid = sksec_new->sid;
4340 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4341 struct socket *other)
4343 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4344 struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security;
4345 struct common_audit_data ad;
4346 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4348 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4350 ad.u.net->sk = other->sk;
4352 return avc_has_perm(ssec->sid, osec->sid, osec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO,
4356 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(struct net *ns, int ifindex,
4357 char *addrp, u16 family, u32 peer_sid,
4358 struct common_audit_data *ad)
4364 err = sel_netif_sid(ns, ifindex, &if_sid);
4367 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4368 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4372 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4375 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4376 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4379 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4383 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4384 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4385 struct common_audit_data ad;
4386 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4389 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4391 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4392 ad.u.net->family = family;
4393 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4397 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4398 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4404 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4407 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4412 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4415 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4416 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4417 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4418 struct common_audit_data ad;
4419 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4424 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4427 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4428 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4431 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4432 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4433 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4434 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4435 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4436 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4438 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4439 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4440 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4443 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4445 ad.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
4446 ad.u.net->family = family;
4447 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4451 if (peerlbl_active) {
4454 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4457 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(sock_net(sk), skb->skb_iif,
4458 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4460 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4463 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4466 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4471 if (secmark_active) {
4472 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4481 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4482 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4487 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4488 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4490 if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4491 sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET)
4492 peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4493 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL)
4494 return -ENOPROTOOPT;
4496 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4500 if (scontext_len > len) {
4505 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4509 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4515 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4517 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4520 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4522 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4525 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4529 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4530 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4532 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4535 *secid = peer_secid;
4536 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4541 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4543 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4545 sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority);
4549 sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4550 sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4551 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec);
4552 sk->sk_security = sksec;
4557 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4559 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4561 sk->sk_security = NULL;
4562 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec);
4566 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4568 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4569 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4571 newsksec->sid = sksec->sid;
4572 newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid;
4573 newsksec->sclass = sksec->sclass;
4575 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec);
4578 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4581 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4583 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4585 *secid = sksec->sid;
4589 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4591 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4592 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4594 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4595 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4596 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4597 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4600 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4601 struct request_sock *req)
4603 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4605 u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family;
4609 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4612 err = selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, peersid, &connsid);
4615 req->secid = connsid;
4616 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4618 return selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request(req, family);
4621 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4622 const struct request_sock *req)
4624 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4626 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4627 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4628 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4629 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4630 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4631 time it will have been created and available. */
4633 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4634 * thread with access to newsksec */
4635 selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(newsk, req->rsk_ops->family);
4638 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4640 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4641 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4643 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4644 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4647 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4650 static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
4652 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
4655 __tsec = current_security();
4658 return avc_has_perm(tsid, sid, SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4661 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_inc(void)
4663 atomic_inc(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4666 static void selinux_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
4668 atomic_dec(&selinux_secmark_refcount);
4671 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4674 fl->flowi_secid = req->secid;
4677 static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
4679 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec;
4681 tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL);
4684 tunsec->sid = current_sid();
4690 static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
4695 static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void)
4697 u32 sid = current_sid();
4699 /* we aren't taking into account the "sockcreate" SID since the socket
4700 * that is being created here is not a socket in the traditional sense,
4701 * instead it is a private sock, accessible only to the kernel, and
4702 * representing a wide range of network traffic spanning multiple
4703 * connections unlike traditional sockets - check the TUN driver to
4704 * get a better understanding of why this socket is special */
4706 return avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__CREATE,
4710 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
4712 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4714 return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4715 TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL);
4718 static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
4720 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4721 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4723 /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it
4724 * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply
4725 * labeling without the support of the TUN user the resulting labeled
4726 * traffic from the other end of the connection would almost certainly
4727 * cause confusion to the TUN user that had no idea network labeling
4728 * protocols were being used */
4730 sksec->sid = tunsec->sid;
4731 sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET;
4736 static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
4738 struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security;
4739 u32 sid = current_sid();
4742 err = avc_has_perm(sid, tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4743 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELFROM, NULL);
4746 err = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET,
4747 TUN_SOCKET__RELABELTO, NULL);
4755 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4759 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4760 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4762 if (skb->len < NLMSG_HDRLEN) {
4766 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4768 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(sksec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4770 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4772 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message:"
4773 " protocol=%hu nlmsg_type=%hu sclass=%hu\n",
4774 sk->sk_protocol, nlh->nlmsg_type, sksec->sclass);
4775 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4785 err = sock_has_perm(current, sk, perm);
4790 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4792 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
4793 const struct net_device *indev,
4799 struct common_audit_data ad;
4800 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4805 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4808 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4809 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4810 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4811 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4814 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4817 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4819 ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
4820 ad.u.net->family = family;
4821 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4824 if (peerlbl_active) {
4825 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
4826 addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
4828 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4834 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4835 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4839 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4840 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4841 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4843 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4849 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4850 struct sk_buff *skb,
4851 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4853 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
4856 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4857 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4858 struct sk_buff *skb,
4859 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4861 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
4865 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4871 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4874 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4875 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4876 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4879 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4881 if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN)
4882 /* if the socket is the listening state then this
4883 * packet is a SYN-ACK packet which means it needs to
4884 * be labeled based on the connection/request_sock and
4885 * not the parent socket. unfortunately, we can't
4886 * lookup the request_sock yet as it isn't queued on
4887 * the parent socket until after the SYN-ACK is sent.
4888 * the "solution" is to simply pass the packet as-is
4889 * as any IP option based labeling should be copied
4890 * from the initial connection request (in the IP
4891 * layer). it is far from ideal, but until we get a
4892 * security label in the packet itself this is the
4893 * best we can do. */
4896 /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */
4897 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4900 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4901 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4907 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
4908 struct sk_buff *skb,
4909 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
4911 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4914 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4918 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4919 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4920 struct common_audit_data ad;
4921 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4927 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4929 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
4931 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
4932 ad.u.net->family = family;
4933 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4936 if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4937 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4938 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4939 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4941 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4942 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
4947 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
4948 const struct net_device *outdev,
4953 int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
4955 struct common_audit_data ad;
4956 struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
4961 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4962 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4963 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4964 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4965 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4966 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4968 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4969 peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
4970 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4976 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4977 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4978 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4979 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4980 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4981 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control.
4982 * NOTE: if this is a local socket (skb->sk != NULL) that is in the
4983 * TCP listening state we cannot wait until the XFRM processing
4984 * is done as we will miss out on the SA label if we do;
4985 * unfortunately, this means more work, but it is only once per
4987 if (skb_dst(skb) != NULL && skb_dst(skb)->xfrm != NULL &&
4988 !(sk != NULL && sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN))
4993 /* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
4994 * from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
4995 * to determine which and if the packet is being forwarded
4996 * query the packet directly to determine the security label. */
4998 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4999 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
5002 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5003 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5005 } else if (sk->sk_state == TCP_LISTEN) {
5006 /* Locally generated packet but the associated socket is in the
5007 * listening state which means this is a SYN-ACK packet. In
5008 * this particular case the correct security label is assigned
5009 * to the connection/request_sock but unfortunately we can't
5010 * query the request_sock as it isn't queued on the parent
5011 * socket until after the SYN-ACK packet is sent; the only
5012 * viable choice is to regenerate the label like we do in
5013 * selinux_inet_conn_request(). See also selinux_ip_output()
5014 * for similar problems. */
5016 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5017 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid))
5019 /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL
5020 * and the packet has been through at least one XFRM
5021 * transformation then we must be dealing with the "final"
5022 * form of labeled IPsec packet; since we've already applied
5023 * all of our access controls on this packet we can safely
5024 * pass the packet. */
5025 if (skb_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
5028 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5032 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_XFRM_TRANSFORMED)
5036 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5039 if (selinux_conn_sid(sksec->sid, skb_sid, &peer_sid))
5041 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5043 /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the
5044 * associated socket. */
5045 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
5046 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
5047 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
5050 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
5052 ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
5053 ad.u.net->family = family;
5054 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
5058 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
5059 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
5060 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5062 if (peerlbl_active) {
5066 if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
5068 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
5069 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
5070 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5072 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
5074 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
5075 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
5076 return NF_DROP_ERR(-ECONNREFUSED);
5082 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5083 struct sk_buff *skb,
5084 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5086 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
5089 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5090 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(const struct nf_hook_ops *ops,
5091 struct sk_buff *skb,
5092 const struct nf_hook_state *state)
5094 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
5098 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5100 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
5104 err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
5108 return selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
5111 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
5112 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
5115 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5118 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5122 sid = task_sid(task);
5123 isec->sclass = sclass;
5125 perm->security = isec;
5130 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
5132 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
5133 perm->security = NULL;
5137 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5139 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5141 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5145 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
5146 msg->security = msec;
5151 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5153 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
5155 msg->security = NULL;
5159 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
5162 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5163 struct common_audit_data ad;
5164 u32 sid = current_sid();
5166 isec = ipc_perms->security;
5168 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5169 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
5171 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
5174 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5176 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
5179 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
5181 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
5184 /* message queue security operations */
5185 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5187 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5188 struct common_audit_data ad;
5189 u32 sid = current_sid();
5192 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
5196 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5198 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5199 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5201 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5204 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5210 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
5212 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
5215 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5217 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5218 struct common_audit_data ad;
5219 u32 sid = current_sid();
5221 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5223 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5224 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5226 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5227 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5230 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5238 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5239 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5242 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5245 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5248 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5254 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5258 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5260 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5261 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5262 struct common_audit_data ad;
5263 u32 sid = current_sid();
5266 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5267 msec = msg->security;
5270 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5272 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5274 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5275 * message queue this message will be stored in
5277 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5283 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5284 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5286 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5287 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5290 /* Can this process send the message */
5291 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5294 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5295 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5296 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5301 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5302 struct task_struct *target,
5303 long type, int mode)
5305 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5306 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5307 struct common_audit_data ad;
5308 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5311 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5312 msec = msg->security;
5314 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5315 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5317 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5318 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5320 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5321 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5325 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5326 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5328 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5329 struct common_audit_data ad;
5330 u32 sid = current_sid();
5333 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5337 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5339 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5340 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5342 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5345 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5351 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5353 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5356 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5358 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5359 struct common_audit_data ad;
5360 u32 sid = current_sid();
5362 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5364 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5365 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5367 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5368 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5371 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5372 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5380 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5381 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5384 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5387 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5394 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5400 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5404 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5405 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5409 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5412 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5414 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5417 /* Semaphore security operations */
5418 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5420 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5421 struct common_audit_data ad;
5422 u32 sid = current_sid();
5425 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5429 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5431 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5432 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5434 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5437 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5443 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5445 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5448 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5450 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5451 struct common_audit_data ad;
5452 u32 sid = current_sid();
5454 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5456 ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC;
5457 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5459 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5460 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5463 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5464 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5472 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5473 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5477 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5488 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5491 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5495 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5501 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5505 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5506 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5511 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5515 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5518 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5524 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5526 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5531 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5534 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5536 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5540 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5543 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5546 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5547 char *name, char **value)
5549 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5555 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5561 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5563 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5565 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5567 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5568 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5569 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5570 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5571 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5572 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5573 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5574 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5582 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5592 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5593 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5595 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5596 struct task_struct *tracer;
5603 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5604 security attributes. */
5609 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5610 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5611 * above restriction is ever removed.
5613 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5614 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5615 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5616 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5617 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5618 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5619 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5620 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5621 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5622 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5628 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5629 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5630 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5634 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid, GFP_KERNEL);
5635 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5636 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
5637 struct audit_buffer *ab;
5640 /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
5641 * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
5642 if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
5643 audit_size = size - 1;
5646 ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR);
5647 audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
5648 audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
5653 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5660 new = prepare_creds();
5664 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5665 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5666 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5667 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5668 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5669 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5670 tsec = new->security;
5671 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5672 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5673 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5674 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5675 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5676 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5679 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5680 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5681 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5682 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5687 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5689 if (!current_is_single_threaded()) {
5690 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5695 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5696 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5697 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5701 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5702 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5705 tracer = ptrace_parent(p);
5707 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5711 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5712 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5731 static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
5733 return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
5736 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5738 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5741 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5743 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid, GFP_KERNEL);
5746 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5752 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5754 static int selinux_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5756 return selinux_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5760 * called with inode->i_mutex locked
5762 static int selinux_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
5764 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
5767 static int selinux_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
5770 len = selinux_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX,
5779 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5780 unsigned long flags)
5782 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5783 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5785 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5789 tsec = cred->security;
5790 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5791 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5793 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5799 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5801 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5807 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5808 const struct cred *cred,
5812 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5815 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5816 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5817 appear to be created. */
5821 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5823 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5824 ksec = key->security;
5826 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5829 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5831 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5832 char *context = NULL;
5836 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5845 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5848 .binder_set_context_mgr = selinux_binder_set_context_mgr,
5849 .binder_transaction = selinux_binder_transaction,
5850 .binder_transfer_binder = selinux_binder_transfer_binder,
5851 .binder_transfer_file = selinux_binder_transfer_file,
5853 .ptrace_access_check = selinux_ptrace_access_check,
5854 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5855 .capget = selinux_capget,
5856 .capset = selinux_capset,
5857 .capable = selinux_capable,
5858 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5859 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5860 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5861 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5863 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5865 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5866 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5867 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5868 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5870 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5871 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5872 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5873 .sb_remount = selinux_sb_remount,
5874 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5875 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5876 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5877 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5878 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5879 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5880 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5881 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5883 .dentry_init_security = selinux_dentry_init_security,
5885 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5886 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5887 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5888 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5889 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5890 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5891 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5892 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5893 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5894 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5895 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5896 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5897 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5898 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5899 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5900 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5901 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5902 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5903 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5904 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5905 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5906 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5907 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5908 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5909 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5911 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5912 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5913 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5914 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5915 .mmap_file = selinux_mmap_file,
5916 .mmap_addr = selinux_mmap_addr,
5917 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5918 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5919 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5920 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5921 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5922 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5924 .file_open = selinux_file_open,
5926 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5927 .cred_alloc_blank = selinux_cred_alloc_blank,
5928 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5929 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5930 .cred_transfer = selinux_cred_transfer,
5931 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5932 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5933 .kernel_module_request = selinux_kernel_module_request,
5934 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5935 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5936 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5937 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5938 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5939 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5940 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5941 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5942 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5943 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5944 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5945 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5946 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5947 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5949 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5950 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5952 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5953 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5955 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5956 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5957 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5958 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5959 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5960 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5962 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5963 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5964 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5965 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5966 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5968 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5969 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5970 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5971 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5972 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5974 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5976 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5977 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5979 .ismaclabel = selinux_ismaclabel,
5980 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5981 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5982 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5983 .inode_notifysecctx = selinux_inode_notifysecctx,
5984 .inode_setsecctx = selinux_inode_setsecctx,
5985 .inode_getsecctx = selinux_inode_getsecctx,
5987 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5988 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5990 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5991 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5992 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5993 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5994 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5995 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5996 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5997 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5998 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5999 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
6000 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
6001 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
6002 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
6003 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
6004 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
6005 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
6006 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
6007 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
6008 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
6009 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
6010 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
6011 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
6012 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
6013 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
6014 .secmark_relabel_packet = selinux_secmark_relabel_packet,
6015 .secmark_refcount_inc = selinux_secmark_refcount_inc,
6016 .secmark_refcount_dec = selinux_secmark_refcount_dec,
6017 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
6018 .tun_dev_alloc_security = selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security,
6019 .tun_dev_free_security = selinux_tun_dev_free_security,
6020 .tun_dev_create = selinux_tun_dev_create,
6021 .tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
6022 .tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
6023 .tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
6025 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
6026 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
6027 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
6028 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
6029 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
6030 .xfrm_state_alloc = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
6031 .xfrm_state_alloc_acquire = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc_acquire,
6032 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
6033 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
6034 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
6035 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
6036 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
6040 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
6041 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
6042 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
6043 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
6047 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
6048 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
6049 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
6050 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
6054 static __init int selinux_init(void)
6056 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
6057 selinux_enabled = 0;
6061 if (!selinux_enabled) {
6062 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
6066 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
6068 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
6069 cred_init_security();
6071 default_noexec = !(VM_DATA_DEFAULT_FLAGS & VM_EXEC);
6073 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
6074 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
6075 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
6078 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
6079 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
6081 if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
6082 panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");
6084 if (selinux_enforcing)
6085 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
6087 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
6092 static void delayed_superblock_init(struct super_block *sb, void *unused)
6094 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
6097 void selinux_complete_init(void)
6099 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
6101 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
6102 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
6103 iterate_supers(delayed_superblock_init, NULL);
6106 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
6107 all processes and objects when they are created. */
6108 security_initcall(selinux_init);
6110 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
6112 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
6114 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
6115 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6117 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6118 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6121 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
6122 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6124 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6125 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6128 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
6129 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6131 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
6132 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6134 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
6136 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
6137 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6139 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
6140 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
6143 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
6144 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
6146 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
6147 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
6152 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
6156 if (!selinux_enabled)
6159 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
6161 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6163 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
6168 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
6170 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6171 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
6173 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
6175 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_nf_ops));
6179 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6181 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6182 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
6185 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
6187 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
6188 static int selinux_disabled;
6190 int selinux_disable(void)
6192 if (ss_initialized) {
6193 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
6197 if (selinux_disabled) {
6198 /* Only do this once. */
6202 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
6204 selinux_disabled = 1;
6205 selinux_enabled = 0;
6207 reset_security_ops();
6209 /* Try to destroy the avc node cache */
6212 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
6213 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
6215 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */